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powers to the gods; lack of knowledge of the soul has 
led men to entertain various terrifying views, of which 
one of the most pernicious is the belief in a future life. 
By giving a purely scientific exposition of the laws of 
Nature, Lucretius hopes to liberate mankind from fear of 
the gods and from apprehensions of future punishment. 
Only when thus emancipated can man devote himself with 
singleness of purpose to the achievement of the highest 
good. 
Of the three branches of the Epicurean Physics, 
Psychology is the most important. As far as ethical 
purpose is concerned, the "De Rerum Natura" reaches its 
cUlmination in the exposition of the nature of the soul 
and the proof of its non-existence after death. How-
ever, since the atomic theory not only fulfils in a 
measure the purpose of the poem, by demonstrating that 
Nature does all things without the intervention of the 
gods, but also is a necessary introduction to a material-
istic oonception of the psychic life, the main principles 
- b -
of the atomic theory will be included in the treatment 
of the Lucretian Theory of the Soul. 
- c -
I. History of the Atomic Theory. 
In the very beginnings of philosophy, men sought 
to discover the nature of the material universe and to 
bring unity out of diversity. Is matter one thing or 
many? Is it continuous or discrete? In the attempt 
to answer these questions, thought flies beyond the 
boundaries of experience to bring back at times truly' 
helpful tidings, even as Lucretius says his master 
passed beyond the "flaming walls of the world" to dis-
cover the laws of nature. 
One of these early excursions into the unknown 
resulted in a theory which was destined to be of tre-
mendous importance in the light of subsequent history. 
This was the atomic theory. 
According to Aristotle and Theophrastus, Leu-
1 
cippus was its originator. The theory was a logical 
development of the beliefs of the Eleatic school of 
which Leucippus is thought to have been a student. 
1. Burnet 1 "Early Greek Philosophy~ 351-2 
- 1 -
In opposition to the Eleatics who taught the unity and 
immoyability of the One, thus denying the existence of 
void and the reality of motion or any sort of physical 
change" Leucippus introduced the idea that the Void is 
as real as Matter and that thewo must exist intermingled 
throughout the universe. In other words, for the One of 
the Eleatics, was substituted an infinite nmnber of small 
indivisible bodies, each of them a sort of Parmenidean 
sphere on a small scale, which move in the Void. In the 
combinations and separations of these bodies consisted 
all the changes that occur in nature. 
This theory reached a more complete stage of 
developement with Democritus, the date of whose death is 
placed at about 360 B.C. Anaxagoras had previously 
taught the existence of mind as a final cause and also 
the doctrine of the similarity of parts. His teachings 
may have influenced the atomist to define his position 
more exactly~ However that may be, Democritus conceived 
of the atoms as eternal and therefore without cause, and 
ascribed to them inherent motion. Furthermore he taught 
1. Brett, "The Philosophy of Gassendi," .. XXI. 
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that all the matter of the universe is simple and homo-
geneouB in substance. 
Nearly a century later, the theory was expanded 
. 
and in some respects corrected by Epicurus to be used 
as the physical basis of a system of ethics. The differ-
encesbetween the theories of the two philosophers are as 
follows: Democritus taught that the number of shapes of 
atoms is infinite; Epicurus that the number of shapes is 
finite, but that the number of atoms of each shape is 
infinite; Democritus believed that the atoms have no 
parts; Epicurus that though indivisible, they have parts; 
Democritus thought that in the eternal fall through in-
finite space, the heavier atoms strike against the 
lighter and that by these collisions worlds are formed; 
Epicurus accepted the objection of Aristotle that bodies 
of unequal weight fall with equal velocity in a vacuum, 
and had recourse to the expedient of atomic declination 
to bring about aggregations of atoms. 
The developments and divergences, which mark the 
transition from a theory of atoms to Epicurean philosophy, 
- 3 -
1 
are sumrDed up as follows by Professor Brett: "Leucippus 
had given only a slender vain of cosmological reasoning; 
Democritus extended the theory to psychology of a sort 
with an appendix of ethics; Epicurus made ethics the 
prime end and aim of the philosophical ~reatment of the 
world and atomism was taken as its guiding principle. III 
A study of the teachings of Epicurus, as re-
corded by Diogenes Laertius, proves that Epicuxus aimed 
at no very exact theQry of knowledge. ~ller indeed 
places the intellectual value of Epicureanism at the 
lowest level. While Epicurus despised learning and 
culture, he attached much importance to the study of 
nature, not for the sake of science but for practical 
purposes. It was truly fortunate for the modern world 
that when Epicurus was in search of a means for dis-
pelling the terrors engendered by the fear of God and 
the thoughts of death, he chose the atomic hypothesis 
of Leucippus and Democritus. It was perhaps just as 
fortunate that Epicureanism found in Lucretius a disciple 
capable of transmitting this doctrine in an attractive 
form. 
1. \\ The Philosophy of Gassendi 1 XXIV. 
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We may read Lucretius for his poetic qualities, 
but we cannot dissociate him from the scientific side 
of his work. Hence it may be well to traoe briefly 
his influence in the realm of science. 
Epicureanism survived the introduction of 
Christianity by about four hundred years and then prac-
tically disappeared as far as its teachings on natural 
philosophy were ooncerned. Incredulity was perhaps the 
predominating characteristic of the Epicurean. He 
denied miracle and eliminated religion from his scientific 
beliefs. l If one considers this fact together with the 
opposition of the Stoics, it is not strange that the 
term 'Epicurean' acquired an evil significance and that 
the adherents of this school received a generous share 
of the maledictions of the Fathers. However at the 
Renaissance, when Europe began the revolt against auth-
ority, the ideas of Epicurus were again treated with 
respect, but it was not until the seventeenth century 
that the atomistic hypotheSis received any serious con-
sideration. 
1. " " " J. M. Guya~) La Morale d'Epicure, 190. 
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Pierre Gassendi, who revived Epicureanism, was, 
strange to say, a man of the Church. Born in 1592 near 
Digne in Provence, a lecturer at the College of Digne 
while still a mere youth, a Doctor of Theology at twenty-
four, and an untiring student and thinker to the end of 
his life;-this in brief outline was the career of 
Gassendi . In hie day, the philosophy of Aristotle 
completely dominated the thought of Europe and schol-
astic quibblings were occupying the place of real 
investigation. Gassendi was thoroughly trained in 
practically all the learning of his time, including 
mathematics, physics, biology, and medicine. This 
extensive learning enabled him to apply constructive 
criticism to philosophy. It was the content of the 
universe as a whole that received his attention. 
Professor Brett says, "From its relation to the in-
vestigation of nature in modern times, Gassendits 
revival of Epicureaniam is of far greater historical 
importance than the renewal of any other system!' 1 
1. 
,, \) 
The Philosophy of Gassendi, 248. 
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The portion of his work of i~nediate interest to 
us is his influence on the reformation of physics by the 
revival of the atomic theory. Granted that atoms were 
once in existence l Gassendi's conception of them was 
practically that of Epicurus. He ascribed to the atom, 
magnitude, ~igurel weight and least parts. The especial 
difficulty lay in the reconciliation of science with 
theology I so Gassendi made room for the work of God by 
denying that atoms were uncreated. He maintained that 
the atoms were self-moving 'Dei gratia' In other 
words l at the beginning God created matter, set the 
atoms in motion~ and prescribed the line of development 
to be followed. So Masson points out, the existence of 
law and order in the universe proved to Gassendi the 
existence of a God as to Lucretius it proved the oppos-
ite. I 
A mighty impetus toward the persistence of the 
atomic theory was afforded by its adoption by Sir Isaac 
Newton. We can trace the'solid, massy, hard, impenetr-
able l movable particles' of Newton back to the teachings 
« ~ 
1. Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet~ Complementary Vol., P.43. 
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of Leucippus. "The turning point in physical philosophy r 
says Professor F. W. Glarke,"is Newton's discovery of 
gravitation, for that indicated mass as the fundamental 
property of matter. For any given portion of matter 
which we can segregate and identify, extension is var-
iable and mass is constant: when that conclusion was 
v 
established, the dominance of atomism became inevitable.l 
The modern theory of atoms as worked out by 
Dalton is historically the Greek t heory but with a very 
important difference. Thus far, differences of atomic 
structure and arrangement of a simple form of matter 
were thought to account for all chemical traneformaticns. 
This was true until Boyle originated the hypothesis of 
different elements. In his 'Sceptical Chymist', he 
gave the first scientific definition of an element as a 
sUbstance which could not be decomposed. The work of 
his auccessors, Lavoisier in particular, gradually es-
tablished in the minds of chemists that there existed 
a series of elements not convertible into one another. 
It was to that series that Dalton appl~ed his atomic 
p II 
1 . The Atomic Theory, Science Vol., 18, n.s. p.5l6. 
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hypothesis. The original element in his work was the 
conclusion that atoms were not of all kinds of shapes, 
but that the atoms of the same element were all ident-
ical in weight while the atoms of different elements 
were different in weight. The earlier atomic spec-
ulations had been qualitative, but now Chemistry was 
given an absolutely quantitative basis; for indefinite 
combinations, definite proportions were substituted. 
From the ~me of Dalton, the atomic theory 
followed two distinct lines of development, one in 
• 
chemistry, the other in physics. Early in the nineteenth 
century, Avogadro distinguished clearly between atoms 
and molecules, although the theory was not accepted for 
nearly fifty years. 
Recently Sir William Ramsay said:"Till a few 
years ago it was believed on indirect evidence that 
everything was composed of atoms; now we know it to be 
so~l This certainty he explains as the result of the 
discovery of radio-active elements by the French 
physicists Becquere.l and Professor and Madame Curie. 
1 ,"AtoTl;s ," Harper's, Vo1., 27, p. 363. 
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Subsequent experiments In this field have led 
to the isolation of the atom and the test of its size 
by Professor Ernest Rutherford of Manchester University, 
and we are told t hat Sir Joseph Thomson has devised a 
metho d of photographing atoms. One hundred years after 
t he adoption of the atomic theory, science demonstrated 
that the atomic unit is made up of smaller units or 
electrons. The theory of electrons does not set aside 
the atom but goes beyond it. The atom is still re-
cogn ized a s a necessary step in the hypothesis. 
Authorities in the scientific realm concede 
that it was t he atomic theory that made possible the 
develppment of chemistry and physics. Of snch impor-
tance was the idea of atoms hypotheSized by Leucippus 
and Democritua. 
- 10 -
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At the beginning of his poem, Lucretius estab-
lishes a scientific basis for his discussion by the 
enunciation of the principle of Law in Nature. 
Epicurus, he tells us, passed beyong. the "flaming walls 
of the world ll and traversed the immense All with the 
power of his intellect, thence he returns as victor to 
report what can and what cannot come into being, and 
finally in what way each thing's power is limited and 
has its deep fixed boundary mar~" 
The first specific application of this principle 
is the statement that "Nothing is ever oreated from 
nothing by Divine powe~" 1 Here the poet is not only 
setting forth a principle of science, but reveals him-
self engaged, like the Titans of old, in a deadly 
struggle with t he gods. Men thought that every 
phenomenon beyond their comprehension occurred t hrough 
the agency of the gods, an agency that all too often 
was not of a ben~ficent character. 2 Hence in proving 
1. I. 150 2. I. 151-4. 
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that every occurrence in nature is the result of an 
antecedent cause, Lucretius is eliminating the gods 
as a disturbing element in the universe. He is 
apparently too completely a materialist to think of 
the Deity as a possible source of laws, for his gods 
are merely a highly refined manifestation of matter and 
the divinities of popular conception, anything but a 
personification or source of law. 
The existence and operation of law in nature 
accepted,Lucretius discusses the constitution of the 
universe. 
He asserts that everything in nature is made 
up of first,matter which fills space and secondly, 
empty space itself, both of which are infinite. 
Matter must be divided by void, but if this division 
were continued to infinity, matter would be reduced to 
no magnitude and would therefore be destroyed. Hence 
it is necessary to assume a smallest portion of matter 
beyond which actual further division would be impossible. 
This is the atom of Leucippus and Democritus, exactly 
- 12 -
defined by the words IInec findi in bina secando ~I 1 
To provide for the further conceivable mental division 
of the physically indivisible particles~ Epicurus 
ascribes to the atoms IIleast parts ll which will be dis-
cussed below. 
These minute~ hard~ indivisible bo~ies, 
Lucretius calls by various names such as ma1eLi~s, 
matter, ~emina_r~r~, seeds of things, geni1ali~ 
£o!p~r~ creative bodies,p~imoLdia and ~olida-priilloLdia 
§.iIflPli.£itaie_ primal elements of solid singleness. 
These atoms are uncreated and eternal. If 
once the power of God is elirninated~ as is done by 
Lucretius, it is impossible to conceive of anything 
antecedent to the primal elements themselves. Being 
the smallest possible divisions of matter, they contain 
no void and as a result are impervious to any destructiv.e 
influence such as heat, cold, moisture, and they cannot 
be orushed. The absolute solidity of the atoms is 
mentioned again and again. Lucretius thinks of the 
atoms as constantly acted upon by the blows of other 
1. I. 533. 
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atoms but, in spite of the incessant buffeting, they 
remain absolutely unchanged throughout all eternity. 
In its hardness, the Lucretian atom differs from that 
of modern science which conceives of the atom as owing 
its mass perhaps merely to electrical changes in ex-
tremely rapi d motion. l Furthermore, Lucretius 
assumes the atoms to be elastic. 
In regard to their substance, the atoms are 
homogeneous; therefore to provide for the multiplicity 
of things , the atoms must have qualitative differences 
ascribed to them. These qualities are magnitude, 
weight, and shape. In addition, by reason of a r range-
ment, the atoms may bear to each other various relations 
in space. 
Inasmuch as the characteristics of the atoms are 
of the utmost importance in Epicurean psychology, it may 
be well to discuss them at some length. 
I n size the atom lies far beneath our perception~ 
but it is not infinitely small. The theory of images 
throws some light on Lucretius's conception of the size 
1. Big1on,"Theoretical and Practical Chemistry," 132. 
2. II, 312-3; IV, 112-3; I. 268 - 70. 
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of atoms. Every object continually gives off in all 
directions films of atomic composition, but the objects 
suffer no apparent loss+ These films stimulate the 
eyes to see, but how much finer must be the atoms of 
those films which are perceptible only to the eye of 
the soul! Furthermore how minute must be the soul 
atoms of an almost microsccipic aniinal! However without 
doubt modern science has demonstrated the atom to be 
much smaller than Lucretius thought it to be. 
The weight of the atoms must be proportionate 
to their size since matter is homogeneous ani the first 
bodies contain no void. 
A further distinction between atoms is differ-
ence of shape. According to Lucretius, the number of 
shapes is finite,2 although the number of atoms of 
each shape is infinite. 3 The difference of shape is 
thought to be due to differing arrangeluents of the 
least parts. Among atoms of the same shape, there may 
be differences of size, and of atoms of the same general 
contour, some may be smoother than others. 4 
1. IV. 42 - 128. 2. II. 479 - 80. 3. II. 523 - 5. 
4. II. 381 - 7. II. 469. 
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It is indeed the shape of the component atoms 
that determines the properties of any substancel . . 
Solids are made up of compacted, hooked, and branching 
atoms which cohere very closely; liquids of smooth and 
round atoms that do not repel each other and at the same 
time permit freedom of movement; flames and gases of 
sharp cornered, not closely united atoms. This ex-
p lanation of the relation of the molecules of solids, 
of liquids and of gases is,if we disregard the shape, 
not unlike the modern theory. Light is composed of small 
a toms; hence its power of penetration. Sluggish liquids 
are made up of large or hooked atoms that impede each other. 
The three above mentioned characteristics, size, 
weight, and shape, are the only qualities of sensible 
objects that Democritus and his successors ascribe to 
the atom. Everything else exists only in opinion. 2 
The abselce of secondary qualities in atoms, Zeller 
sums up as follows: "To the primitive bodies themselves, 
the atoms, we must not ascribe any of those particular 
qualities, but merely those ~ithout which an existence 
1. II. 444, fl. 
2. Diogenes Laertius,"Livea of Eminent Philo90Phers,~ 
<iJ.e. '" , .. r i h.. s , xrr:. . 
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or a body would not be thinkable." 
The atoms have no color; the color of sensible 
objects depends upon the combination of atoms. 1 Neither 
are the primal elements possessed of heat; the sensations 
of heat and cold are caused by atoms of certain sh~pes.2 
They are devoid of sound, moisture, or odor. TheY are 
neither pliant, frangible, nor hollow, for these con-
ditions would render matter susceptible to dissolution, 
but the atom is always "soliM simp1icitate." 3 
With one simple, basic substance, all qualities 
of things must be the result of the shape, size, and 
relation in space of the atoms of which they are com-
posed, and all changes including life and death must be 
due to an altered combination of atoms. Lucretius 
states this idea repeatedly. "You may rather postulate 
certain atoms endowed with such a nature that, if they 
happen to produce fire, they will be able, when a few 
have been removed and a few added and their arrangenent 
amd motion altered, to constitute ai~" 4 
1. II. 757, fl. 2. II. 431 - 3. 3. II. 842 - 64. 
4. I. 798 - 803. 
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Again, after speaking of the various combinations 
of the same letters to form words, Lucretius says: 
"So much are the letters able to accomplish merely 
by a change of arrangement, but the primal elements are 
able to admit of more combinations whence each several 
thing is created~l 
"This proposition," says Lange, "that atoms have 
no qualities except figure, size, and weight, which 
formally denies the existence of intrinsic qualities as 
Opposed to external motions and combinations, forms one 
of the characteristic features of all Materialism. 
With the assumption of intrinsic qualities the atom has 
become a monad and we pass on to Idealism or-PantheistiC 
Naturalism. "2 
1. I. 827 - 9. 
2. "History of Materialism/" Vol. II. 
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III. The Kinetics of the Atom. 
With the exposition of the qualities of the 
atoms, only half of Lucretims's explanation of the 
phenomena of the universe is completed. Indeed the 
existence of what we call the world and all that it 
contains, from aggregations of gross matter to the 
subtle fabric of the mind, depends upon the movements 
of the atoms and their resulting relations in space. 
The first statement in regard to kinetics is 
that"matter does not cohere inseparably massed together~ 
This condition is made possible by the existence of 
void. 2 The belief in the motion of the primal 
elements, Lucretius derives from the constant mutations 
occurring before his very eyes l - mutations which, he 
infers, must occur throughout the universe. In fact, 
he regards the motion of the atoms as the ultimate form 
of the energy of the universe. 
Furthermore, the atoms never stop.3 Two motions 
are ascribed to them, the one downward in virtue of 
1, II, 67 8. 2~ I, 329 - 3Q. 
3, II, 95 - 6, 297 - 9. 
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gravitation, and the other, the result of the shocks 
received from other atoms. 1 This second atomic motion, 
due to a rebound after collision, presents a serious 
difficulty. Lucretius says,"For in every case when 
the moving atoms meet and clash, the result is that 
they suddenly leap apart in opposite directions; and 
this is not 6tra~e since they are very hard and of 
solid mass and there is nothing behind to stop them~2 
HoweverJperfectly hard and solid atoms could 
not ret>ound. The ability to rebound depends upon the 
distort ion that a body undergoes when it is subjected 
to stress, but atoms of perfect hardness and solidity 
would suffer no deformation when struck and therefore 
could not behave as though elastic. After collision 
they would cling to each other and move onward together. 
Furthermore, during the instant of collision or im-
mediately following it, the energy of motion in a per-
fectly solid body could not be converted into heat or 
Vibration or any other form of energy.3 However, it 
may be possible that Lucretius's idea of solidity 
1, 83 - 5. 2, II, 85 - 8. 
3, Masson's "Lucretius Epicurean and Poet," 119. 
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differs from the conception of modern physicists and 
that in his description of the atom, he is struggling 
with the inadequacy of the Latin in the realm of scien-
tific terms. 
Moreover, not only are the atoms in the mid-
spaces of the worlds in motion, but also those which 
are combined in substances of apparently stable com-
position. 
The atoms which, after collision rebound so as 
to leave small spaces between them, form substances 
like iron or rock, while those that rebound through a 
longer path form gases. l There is conclusive 
evidence that Lucretius thinks of the atoms in com-
bination as moving and still retaining their initial 
velOCity. For example, he says, "It makes a great 
difference with what atoms and in what anrangement the 
primal elements are held together and what_motlolis_the~ 
)l 2 m.utual.lY~ive !¥ld receiv~. Another passage proves that 
the atomic motion continues when the atoms are combined: 
"The atoms of all things flit about ~ sponte driven on 
1. II, 100 - 7. 2. I, 817 - 9. 
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" by eternal motion. 2 The words ~ sponte apparently mean 
that the motion or rather the ultimate cause of motion) is 
inherent in the atoms and not derived from a divine source. 
Epicurus also teaches that the atoms of compound substances 
are all moving at the same rate of speed. 3The only dif-
ference in the motion of the atoms that form rock and of 
those that form air is that the former rebound through 
a shorter distance and hence must describe the pa th of 
vibration more frequentlYI while the atoms of a gas .de-
scribe a longer path, but less frequently. 
Lucretius ~ry frequently treats of the atoms as 
though they were molecules. Nowhere does he make the 
distinction although he hints at an idea similar to the 
molecule in one passage where he speaks of the particles 
of heat as gathered together in globular masses in contra-
distinction to individual atoms. 4 The especial diffi-
culty arising from this confuaion is in its bearing upon 
the kinetics of the atom. Lucretius tells us that all 
atoms move with the same rapidity, but in numerous pass-
ages he speaks of certain atoms as more mobile than 
2. III) 31 - 3. 
4. II, 153 - 4. 
3. Diogenes Laertius X, 24. 
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others. For instance, water passes through a colander 
very quickly while sluggish oil is slow to do so because 
t he oil is composed either of larger atoms or of those 
that have more hooks. lAgain, honey flows more slowly 
than water because the latter consists of smaller, 
rounder, and smoother atoms which are therefore more 
easily Jnoved. 2 Moreover the various ingredients of 
the soul differ in mobility according to the size of 
their first beginnings. 3 Indeed upon this theory is 
built the whole explanation of the operations of the 
soul. Lucretius perhaps means that the mole£ule~ of 
these various substances differ in size, coherence, and 
veloCity. 
• 
The speed of the atoms, Lucretius considers to 
be enormous, in fact much greater than what he conceives 
to be the veloCity of light. 4 
This theory of the motion of the ultimate 
particles of matter is now accepted by scientists as 
correct, and the velocity of the molecules of various 
SUbstances has been measured. 
1. III, 186 - 95. 2. III, 195. 
4. II, 150 - 63. 
- 23 _ 
3. III, 205. 
After describing the motions of the atoms, 
Lucretius explains how sensible objects are enabled to 
move. He speaks first of the motes dancing in the sun-
beams and then proceeds thus: "Doubtless all bodies 
have this motion from the atoms. For the atoms move of 
their own inherent force; then those bodies which con-
sist of small aggregations and which are as it were 
nearest to the force of the atoms, are set in motion by 
the unseen blows of these (atoms) and they in turn move 
those (combinations) that are a little larger. Thus 
motion mounts upward from the primal elements and comes 
gradually to our perception so that those things are 
likewise moved which we are able to see in the light of 
the sun, but by what blows they accomplish this is not 
apparent. ttl 
This probably should not re construed to mean 
that when a small body passes on its movement to a 
heavier one, there is a multiplication of the mechanical 
energy expended, for Lucretius teaches that the sum of 
the energy of the universe does not change. A emaIl 
1. II, 132 - 41. 
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body in rapid motion could produce a slower movement in 
a heavier body and this a yet slower movement in a still 
heavier body. Inasmuch as the movements of visible ob-
jects are very slow in comparison with the enormous 
velocity of the atoms, the theory appears reasonable. 
Having given an exposition of the kinetics of 
the atom, correct in its main features, Lucretius in-
troduces a theory wherein his ethical system secures 
the ascendancy over his scientific knowledge. This is 
the theory of Declination, a device useful not only to 
account for the formation of the world, but also to 
explain the existence of Free-Will in man. 
Lucretius explains the nature of Declination 
as follows: "When the atoms are carried straight down-
ward through the void by reason of their own weight, at 
a quite uncertain time and in quite uncertain places, 
they push aside a little, only enough so that you may 
say that the impulse has changed. If they were not 
accustomed to swerve they would all fall downward like 
drops of rain through the immense void, no clashing 
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would have taken place and no collisions would have been 
caused for the primal elements: so nature would never 
have created anything. nl 
This theory is peculiar to the physics of 
Epicurus. Democritus, conceiving of the atoms as 
streaming "down" space in parallel lines, explained the 
formation of worlds by the assumption that the heavier 
atoms would fall more rapidly than the lighter ones and 
hence would overtake the latter, thereby causing col-
lisions. Epicurus however, accepted the objection of 
Aristotle that bodies of unequal weight would fall with 
equal velocity in a vacuum since void could offer no 
resistance. 2 Atoms thus,falling through space would 
be at rest with reference to each other, would be no 
source of power, and never could form any sort of 
aggregations. The theory of declination enables the 
atoms to clash, exert all their force upon each other, 
and,out of the infinity of collisions, to form the 
nuclei of worlds. 
This theory is regarded as one of the dis-
1. II, 217 - 24. 2. II, 225 - 42. 
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73. 2. II, 251 - 93. 
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is the m~st important branch of physics in the estim-
ation of the Epicureans. With them, the mind is not 
O\le.l' 
the power &f matter, but merely a very perfect form of 
matter. The action of the mind is formulated in te~ms 
of the motion of atoms and conse~uently,if the atoms of 
the mind were obliged to follow the inexorable laws of 
mechanics, man would be the slave of Necessity. By 
allowing the atoms to swerve the least bit, the Epi-
cureans enable man to exert control over his own acts. 
Most of the difficulties of the theory of 
declination must be left for consideration until the 
Lucretian psychology has been examined. There is one 
question, however, which may properly be asked here. 
How is it possible for atoms to swerve at all? 
Lucretius insists that the swerve is very slight, 
t 1 .. t 1 nee p us quam m1n1mum. We are not to think of the 
effect of declination as an oblique motion. On a 
number of points, where Materialism is weak, the re-
sponsibility for the answer to certain questions is 
shifted so as to make the difficulty as remote as 
possible. In this instance, by reducing the latitude 
1. II, 244 - 5. 
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of the swerve, Lucretius apparently hopes to avoid a 
violent conflict with the laws of mechanics and to 
escape a contradiction of the evidence of sense per-
ception. He says that to an observer bodies seem 
to fall straight toward the earth, but no one can 
af~i~m that they do not swerve at all. l 
Science helps somewhat in answering the question 
of the possibIlity of the swer \e. Professor Jenkin. 
applies in this connection the principle of mechanics 
that a force acting at right angles to the direction in 
which a body is mOVing, does no work although it may 
continually alter the direction in which the body movea~ 
No expenditure of energy, then, would be required to 
cause the deflection. Yet the difficulty is not re-
moved. 
It has been stated that the only ultimate form 
of energy recognized by Lucretius is the atoms in motion 
and we have seen how declination rendered the atoms, 
originally in a state of rest with reference to each 
other, the source of this power. 
1. II, 246 - 250. 3. Masson, "Lucretius 
Epicurean and Poe~" p. 134. 
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The last important proposition regarding the 
kinetics is that this energy once developed is constant. 
Lucretius says, "For the supply of matter ------ has 
neither reoeived any addition nor suffered any loss. 
For this reason, the atoms were in time gone by in the 
same motion as they now are, and hereafter in a similar 
manner they will be borne on eternally~ . l 
Furthermore he argues that since the universe 
is infinite, 'no power can alter the sum of things.' 2 
In other words, since neither atoms nor their motion 
can be created, altered, or destroyed, the entire 
amount of energy in the universe must remain the same. 
This is a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the Conser-
vation of Energy. Perhaps the most apparent diff erence 
between the belief of Lucretius and that of modern 
physicists lies in the fact that the tormer does not 
recognize the transmutation of the energy of motion 
into that of heat, or electricity or any other mani-
festation. 
The main principles of the atomic theory of 
1. II, 296 - 9. 2. II, 303. 
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Lucretius have now been traced. His entire system of 
physics reaches its culmination in the exposition of the 
nature of the Soul. 
IV. The Lucretian Theory of Life. 
In the Epicurean philosophy, life and sensation 
are inseparable and the term .'Soul', as employed by 
Lucretius, covere both the vital principle and the 
vehicle of consciousness. Hence any treatment of the 
Epicurean psychology must involve the theory of life. 
First of all, the existence of Life presupposes 
an organic whole, a principle which, by the side of the 
atoms and the void, is something wholly new. This fact 
Lucretius does not recognize. He admi t s of only two 
fundamental entities, statir.g his belief in the following 
worjs :l 
"Besides atoms and void, there can be no third 
nature in the number of things, either that falls under 
our perception at any time or that anyone can grasp by 
process of reasoni~g: Everything else is either an 
essential property or an accident of matter and void. 2 
Thus according to Lucretius, Life must be an incidental 
1. I, 445 - 8. 2. 449 - 50. 
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aspect involved in the flux of matter. Hence it is 
not surprising that his explanation of Life is essen-
tially identical with that of color, hardness, shape, 
or any other accident. 
Such a theory is the logical result of a 
materialistic conception of the universe, but the 
difficulties involved in the exclusion of any thir4 
principle are insurmountable. 
Lucretius's fundamental position is that the 
sentient is developed out of the non-sentient. l He 
gives an elaborate proof that the atoms are utterly 
dead and indeed devoid of most of the qualities of 
sensible objects. If the sentient comes on~y from 
the sentient, the primal elements must be mortal like 
the whole animal, but the first beginnings are eternal. 2 
As a climax to hie argument, Lucretius indulges in a 
~eduotlo_ad a~u£dum~ saying that we should find the 
atoms laughing and weeping, and instituting philosoph-
ical discussions concerning their own composition if 
they were sensate. 3 
1. II, 865 - 7. 2. II, 902 - 6. 3. II, 973-90. 
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In substantiation of his position, Lucretius 
brings forward what he considers conclusive proof. 
Viorlns are produced from fil th when it is disintegrated 
by the rains; waters, leaves and pastures change into 
flocks; Nature converts food into living bodies; from 
food she creates all living things (OmP~8 ~eA~us);l 
again eggs produce birds. a 
All t hese illustrations are apparently invalid. 
In the first place, the weight of experimental science 
all tends to the conclusion tr~t life can be produced 
only from antecedent life;3 in the second example, 
Lucretius leaves cut of account the fact that food is 
changed into living tissue only through the operation 
of already existing vital processes; and in the last, 
the germ of life is present. 
Having proved to his satisfaction that the-
living forms can come from dead matter, Lucretius ex-
plains that not all atoms are capable of producing life. 
His statement is as follows: 4 
"It will behoove you to remember ----- that it 
1. II, 871 - 80. II, 927. 
3. Sir Oliver Lodge, "Life and Matte~" p .171. 
4. II, 891 - 6. 
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makes a great difference first of all, how small those 
- - - --
atoms are which create the sentient and with what shape 
they are endowed, and finally what motions, arrangements, 
and positions they have." This is the same formula 
that Lucretius uses to explain the formation of the 
earth and all that it contains. The significant fact 
here is the use of the words "how small those atoms are'/' . 
This expression occurs nowhere else in this connection. 
From this passage as well as from the treatment of the 
Soul in Book III, it is evident that only very minute 
atoms can'produce life. On the other hand, when suit-
able atoms of a certain size and shape are placed in 
a certain specific spatial relation to others and are 
endowed with a certain vibration, life must result. 
We may ask now, "What is the Lucretian definition 
of Life? tI The first hint at a reply is found where the 
poet tells us that Nature converts food into living 
bodies .1 This implies that life must be a form of 
material energy. A clearer answer is given in a nUffiber 
of other passages to the effect that Life is a 'mode of 
1. II, 879 - 80. 
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motion of the atoms'~ For instance l "By the com-
bined atomic motion (of soul and body) sensation is 
kindled and blown into flame throughout the frame~2 
Furthermore, a very serious shock confounds the sen-
sations "for the arrangements of the atoms are de-
stroyed and the yiialm.oiiQnl! are impeded to the core.,,3 
If the shock is not 60 severe, the remaining vilal 
mol i Qnl! may prevail, allay the tumult, restore orderly 
m01iQn, and rekindle sensation. 4 If life continues 
as long as certain atoms communicate their movement to 
each other, and ceases when this motion is destroyed, 
life must be nothing more or less thaD some specific 
motion of the atoms. 
Since atomic motion is, according to Lucretius, 
the only ultin~te form of energy, life is one manifest-
ation of the energy of the -universe. That life is such 
is denied by Sir Oliver Lodge, although there are those 
who hold the opposite opinion. 5 
Perhaps few poets have depicted life in a more 
vivid manner than has Lucretius. Many of his expres- , 
1. This is Mr. WAsson's definition. 2. - III, 335 - 6. 
3. II, 944 - 8. 4. II, 954 - 9. 5. "Life and 
Ma tter," p. 18. 
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sions cannot be forgotten. The trees, with energy 
unbridled, run a race as they climb upward into the 
air. The frisky young of the herds disport themselves 
in the meadows utterly intoxicated with the joy of 
livin!Z'. 
"'" 
With this Lucretius's theory of the origin of 
life is in strange contrast. However, in view of the 
state of scientific knowledge in his time, it is not 
strange that he makes so slight an attempt to bridge 
the chasm between dead atoms and living creatures. 
Lucretius undoubtedly hae complete faith in the sufficiency 
of his theory. He says, "manifest facts ------ lead 
you by the hand and compel you to believe," and an 
opposing theory he frequently characterizes with the 
words, "perridiculum esse videtu~" . while the reader is 
kept from a sceptical view of the poet's doctrines by 
the warning, "Id licet hinc quamvis hebeti cognoBcere 
cord~" 
By making the atoms which produce life as fine 
as possible, Lucretius no doubt thinks to solve the 
difficulty. This concept of matter practically de-
materialized will be found again in connection with the 
- 37 -
r of 
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Wm. James adds testimony in speaking of Clifford's 
Theory of Mind-Stuff: l 
"No possible number of entities (call them as 
yeu like, whether forces, material particles, or 
mental elements) can sum themselves together. Each 
remains in the sum what it always was; and the sum 
itself exists QnlY_for_a_bys1ander_who happens to 
overlook the units and apprehend the sum as such: 
When absolutely dead matter, without a single 
living cell is taken as a basis for scientific reason-
ing, the problem is even more difficult. 
There is, however, another theory that has 
been brought forward by materialists in explanation of 
the origin of life. This is the power of carbon 
and of some other non-elementary bodies such as water, 
of linking to themselves not only atoms of the same 
substance, but also of others into an exceedingly large 
and complex molecule. Sir Oliver Lodge tells us that 
if such a molecule gathers to itself others until there 
results a molecule containing millions or billiono of 
1. "Prine iples of Psychology," Vol. I I, 158 - 9. 
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atoms, new properties may be expected to appear, as for 
instance a million earths aggregated together would ac-
quire the property of radio-activity, would become self-
heating and self-luminous I would in fact be a sun. l 
Likewise such an unstable aggregation of matter 
might serve as the vehicle of influences wholly un-
expected, e. g. of life. He says it is extremely 
improbable that such an aggregation can generate life. 
All that has been verified is that a "complex molecular 
aggregate is capable of being the vehicle or material 
bas is of life_" 
When scientists of the present day tell us that 
"life may be something not only ultra-terrestrial, but 
even immaterial I something outside our present categor-
2 ies of matter and energ~" Lucretius should not be 
harshly judged for the futility of his explanation. 
The object he has in view is to dispense with 
the gods. He believes that the three infinities of 
space l atoms, and time enable him to do so. For him, 
an infinite number of atoms attempting numberless COID-
1. "Life and Matter," p. 157 - 171. 
2. "Life and Ma tter/' , p. 173. 
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binations through countless ages l can replace creation 
ordered by a divine intelligence. 
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V. The Nature: and Functions of the Soul. 
The general character of the Lucretian theory 
of the soul is determined by the fact that Materialism 
reduces everything to complexes of atoms and all action 
to their motions. The application of this principle 
to life has been noted; its bearing upon the nature of 
the soul remains to be examined. 
The term soul includes the principle of life 
and all those operations which are recognized today as 
functions of the brain and nervous system. In this 
connection, one must remember that the ancients knew 
nothing of the structure and use of the nervous system. 
Lucretius's first statement is that the soul 
is not a harmony between the various parts of the body 
or, to state the idea more clearly, it is not the re-
I 
suIt of a given state of body. It is an actual part 
of a man, a genuine constituent of bodily life, an 
organ just as @uch as the limbs. 2 
Entirely in harmony with this view, is the 
1. III, 94 -97. 2. 130 - 132 
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statement that the soul is of a corporeal nature.l 
Lucretius tries to prove that the soul is material by 
the, fa at that it moves the body, rouses it from sleep, 
controls the facial expression, and is, in turn, 
affected by injuries to the body. None of these 
interactions could occur without the actual contact of 
soul and body. 2 If we admit the fundamental rna ter ial-
istic principle that nothing can be conceived of as 
incorporeal except Void, but that Void cannot be either 
active or passive, we are obliged to accept Lucretius's 
theory and say that since the soul acts and is acted 
upon, it must be of a material nature. 
Lange says that to materialists of the present 
time, this theory of the soul as consisting of matter 
would be most repugnant. Ignorance of nerve force and 
the functions of the brain made the belief acceptable 
to the ancients. 
Soul and body interact because the union of the 
two is so complete. They are intricately interwoven 
with each other;3 the mind suffers many ills because of 
1. 161 - 4. 2. 165 - 6. 
3. 739 - 40. 
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its aiose connection with the body.l The soul substance 
is received from the parents' souls, and it grows along 
with the body. 2 Through their association from the 
beginning of their existence, body and soul are enabled 
to work in harmony3 and the latter is able to permeate 
the former and grow in the very blood and bones, instead 
of occupying a special compartment of its own as would 
be the case, were it inserted in the body at birth4. 
Joint partners in life, the two are mutually dependent~ 
It is as impossible to separate the soul from the body 
without destroying the latter, as it is to remove the 
fragrance from a lump of frankincense. 6 Neither apart 
from the other seems capable of sensation, but sensation 
, 
is kindled and blown into flame throughout the body by 
the common atomic motions of the body and soul. 7 During 
life, the body enjoys sensation because of the presence 
of the soul, but it loses this property at death, be-
cause sensation, while inherent in the soul, is only an 
accident of the body.8 
The soul is corporeal but its material substance 
~ 
1.JJ¥· 734. 2. 337, 445 - 6, 746 - 7. 3. 344. 
4. 683 5. 5. 332. 6. 327 - 30. 
7. 333 - 36. 8. 350 - 58. 
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must be of a kind to explain its peculiar nature. This, 
according to Lucretius and his predecessors of the atom-
istic school, lies in its animating and motive force. 
The soul is that which effects the movement, sensation, 
and thought of living beings, but to do this it must it-
self, be in constant motion. 'Mechanical motion, the 
only kind re oognized 1::y Lucretius, can be produced only 
by what is moved. Hence the'rY\.obility ascribed to the 
soul atoms. 
From the speed of thoughtl , and the fact that 
the soulless body is as heavy as the living one 2, 
Lucretius draws the inference that the soul atoms must 
be exceedingly minute, round and smooth~ The action of 
the mind is more rapid than that of anything else in 
nature4; therefore its atoms must be not only easily set 
in motion but also be unencumbered with hooks or any 
appar&tuB to impede their movements. Furthermore death 
takes away nothing except sensibility and the vital 
warmth;5 hence the atome of the vital principle must be 
exceedingly small and light in weight. The latter il-
lustration, Lucretius elaborates ~ comparing the soul 
l. 
4. 
III, 182 - 3. 
184 - 5. 
2. 230. 
5. 212 - 15. 
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3. 203 - 5. 
with the bauquet of wine. l Each is atomic, but neither 
at its departure causes a perceptible diminution of sub-
stance. If the atoms of soul scattered throughout the 
body could be collected in one place, they would occupy 
an exceedingly minute portion of space2 • 
It has been noted that large atoms supplied with 
hooks, which entangle neighboring elements, form solid, 
enduring substances such as iron or rock. At the op-
posite end of the gradlAation series stand the soul atoms. 
It is interesting to observe, in this connection, that 
Lucretius seems to assort the atoms into three classes 
according to size and shape. Large, intricately 
shaped atoms are the constituents of dead matter; those 
that are smaller and smoother are capable of composing 
organic matter; those that are perfectly spherical and 
most minute are the elements of soul. 
Not only are the soul atoms smaller than those 
of the body but they are fewer in number~3 
Democritus taught that atoms of soul and body 
alternate with each other4 , but Lucretiussays that the 
l.$. 221. 2. 208 - 10 4. 370 - 4 
3. 374 - 7. 
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soul atoms are distinguished at greater intervals than 
those of the body. His statement is as follows: "You 
may be able to avow that the atoms of soul have spaces 
between them proportionate to the size of the tiny 
1 bodies which, if thro\m upon us, first excite sensation." 
Lucretius here has the idea that not every minute area 
of the skin is sensitive, the result, we now know, of 
the fact that there is some distance between nerve end-
ings. One does not feel minute particles of dust, or 
a spider web, or thistle down, or feathers, or the tread 
of an insect, bec~use these objects do not touch atous 
of the soul. 2 GULssani points out the fact that a 
thread of spider's web or a feather would, because of 
length, bridge the intervals between soul atoms and 
therefore arouse sensation, were those atoms at the 
surface. So it seems that the intervals are of pro-
fundity.3 It is entirely possiole J ho ever, that a 
spider's web might because of its meshes touch only 
the interstices between soul atoms. 
Lucretius continues, "It is necesaary to arouse 
1. 376 - 80. 2. 381 - 90. 3. Duff. p. 62. 
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many atoms (of body) in us before the atoms of soul, 
scattered throughout the frame in our bodies, perceive 
that atoms (of the body) have been struck and before 
they, being separate, are able'to rush together and 
meet with repeated clashing and in turn to leap apart ~,l 
This seems to indicate that a considerable shock is 
needed to reach the soul atoms and that furthermore a 
number of these must be aroused in order for them to 
encounter each other and thus transmit se~sation. 
This is where the smoothness of the soul atoms 
is of great importance. Smooth elements are not sub-
ject to entanglement to such a degree as are those of 
rough or hooked surface and hence can oscillate through 
a longer distance. 2 
It should be noted that in the discussion of 
the soul atoms, Lucretius apparently confuses atoms and 
molecules. Unless one makes the distinction, much of 
what is said about the cause of sensation seems contra-
dictory to the fundamental propositions of t.le kinetics 
of the atom. 
1 . . 391 - 5. 2. II, 100 - 108. 
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In connection with the distribution of soul 
atoms, it would be somewhat difficult for Lucretius to 
explain why these are apparently closer together or 
nearer the surface at the finger tips for instance, 
since he maintains that the various organs were not 
made to perform a specific function, but that the use 
was found for the organ. l 
The nature of the soul is, according to 
Lucretius, twofold. It consists of the rational soul 
or Animus and the irrational soul or Anim~. 
Throughout his treatment of psychology, 
Lucretius wrestles with a difficulty of terminology. 
I \ '6 v ., In the Greek, yv X n is divided into '/0 I'- yav f XO v 
,...' ~ l 
and 10 ~ AOYOY but the Latin knO'lS no such distinction. 
Hence Lucritius is compelled to divide the anim~ or 
whole soul into an!mus and anim~. This lack of suit-
able terms results in a certain amount of ambiguity, which 
renders still more arduous the elucidation of an already 
sufficiently difficult portion of the poem. 
In this discus s ion, the term 8oul, will be used 
1. IV. 822 - 842. 
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to cover both the rational and irrational soul, and the 
latter terms will be expressed, for the sake of brevity 
and clearness, by the Latin words. 
Nowhere does Lucretius speak of the animu~ and 
He insists that they are 
indissolubly connected with each other and make up one 
nature. l The extant writings of Epicurus say nothing 
of this division, but, from the fact that the Roman poet 
follows his master faithfully in other particulars, we 
may feel certain that the latter discriminated between 
the two. Epicurus may have adopted this portion of 
his theory from the works of Plato and Aristotle. 
Such a division of the soul's functions harmon-
izes with Epicurus's use of sense perception as the 
criterion of truth~ The material soul must be ex-
tended and therefore must have a location. Joy, sorrow, 
and fear all affect the beating of the heart; hence the 
animus is located in the heart. 3 Moreover a snake's 
tai14 or a severed limb continues to quiver for a time,5 
so the vital principle or ~nima is distributed through-
1. 
3. 
III, 136 - 7, 398 - 9. 
III, 140 - 2. 4. 
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2. IV, 478 - 9. 
657 - 665. 5. 653. 
out the body,l Of the two functional divisions of the 
soul, the animus is the superior2 • It is the seat of 
the reason, the will, and the emotions. 
The words animus and mena are often used synon-
ymously by Lucretius, but the former is really the 
broader term, mens being restricted to the purely in-
tellectual side of the anilllus. 
The power of intellection belongs to the 
rational soul exclusively. Lucretius calls it 'the 
power of reason that directs the 1if~'~ It is the 
head and re igns supreme in the Whole body. 'It alone 
I 4 
has the power of reason (~g,Ciu~ §:lbj. §<?l}l~ :g.e_r_s~ sa.p it ) . 
-It alone can initiate voluntary action5 or resist 
compulsion6 , for in it the will resides7 . A mental 
process tliUSt precede every vo1untary8action for 'no-
one begins to do anything before the mind sees in 
anticipation that which it \lishes.,9 Again 'nothing 
is seen to be done with such swiftness as the mind 
forms a concept of the act ion and, itself, begins i t .' ~O 
In addition, the animus is the seat of the 
III , 143. 2. III, 138. 3, 94 - 95. 
145. 5. 143 - 4; II, 259 - 60. 6. 277 - 83. 
1. 
4. 
7. II, 265, 268 - 9. 8. III , 144. 9. IV, 883-4 
10. III, 182-3. 
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emotions .1 If not very intense, the feeling of joy, 
sorrow, fear or what not, may be confined to the animus2 
but, if sufficiently violent, the anima participates in 
the disturbance , as is shown by the fact that the 
symptonis such as pallor, perspiration, or faintness, 
are not restricteQ to the breast. 3 
The anima is subordinate to the animus~ Like 
the l atter , it is an organ of the body. One of its 
chief functions is to convey sensation and cons~quently 
life to the body. During life, the body has sensation 
because of the presence of the anima5 . This function 
is also illustrated where portions of the anima are rent 
to pieces successively and in consequence a man dies by 
inches. 6 Another highly important office is to convey 
the motion of the will to the body and enable the body 
to act in accordance with the volition.? Thus the 
anima performs the work of the efferent nerves. 
Of the two, the animus is more necessary to life 
than the anima8 • The latter may be almost entirely 
lost when the limbs are shorn from t he body, but if the 
1. III, 141-2. 
4. 143 
? 144. 
4. 
2. 
5. 
8. 
III, 149 - 51. 
350 9. 
396 - ? 
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3. 
6. 
149 - 58 
60? - 12. 
animus is lost 1 death ensues. 
The distinction between the functions of the 
animus and the anima may be compared with the modern 
psychological distinction between consciousness and 
subconsciousness. Professor Stout says that if we 
analyze our total experience at any moment 1 we shall 
find in it material which is not at the moment con-
tributing to the cognitive function of consciousness. 
Those modifications of consciousness which are capable 
of fulfilling the function of presentation may exist 
even when they are not the means of cognizing objects. 
They may exist as possible material for discriminatiR~ 
thinking without being utilized to the full extent. 
At any moment, the thought-discrimination c.oes not 
keep pace with the differentiation of the sensory data 
supplied. To make anyone of these the object of 
thought would require a long series of successive acts 
of attention. l 
In general, it is the function of the animus 
to think and that of the anima to gather the material 
for thou~ht for it is the anima that is present in the 
1. Stout, "Manual of Psychology," 69. 
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sense organs. Lucretius thinks of each of the func-
tional divisions of the soul as capable of at least 
sellii-independent operation. l The eye itself sees2 . 
the stimulation occuring in the atoms of anima, and 
Lucretius says that if one does not pay attention, it 
is just as though there w·ere nothing in the field of 
vision. 3 Furthermore the an~mus may be so engrossed 
with a train of thought that it fails to notice the 
sensat ions received by the anima. This point Lucretius 
illustrates by the statement that a soldier intent on 
battle ofter does not notice for some time that he has 
been wounded4 • The impressions made on the anima could 
be raised from the realm of the aub-conscious only by the 
attention. 
The mode of operation of the rational and 
irratienal soul must be treated later under the "Theory 
of Emana t iens" . 
Various views concerning the nature of the soul 
obtained before the time of Epicurus. Aristotle tells 
us that those thinkers who laid stress on the soul's 
knowledge and perception of all that exists, identified 
l. 
3. 
III, 114-5, 145 - 151. 
IV, 811 - 13. 
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2. 
4. 
III, 359 - 62. 
III, 642 - 653. 
the soul with the ultimate particles whether they re-
cognized a plurality of these or not l • Thus Anaximenes 
thought that the soul consists of "air", the term at 
that time meaning water in a vaporous state2 . Emped-
ocles compounded the soul out cf all the elements, i.e. 
earth, a ir, fire, and water, while at the same time 
regarding ea ch as a soul. Heraclitus and Democritus 
taught that the soul is of the nature of fire~ 
Diogenes of Apollonia maintained that warm, dry air 
constituted the sOUl l ; Hippo asserted the soul to be 
water;lothers like Critias believed it to be blood. l 
In fact each of the four elements recognized by 
Empedocles and Aristotle except earth found its sup-
porter as the material of the soul. l 
Of all these theories that of Diogenes of 
Apollonia and - to a slighter degree - that of 
Anaximenea most resemble the belief of Epicurus and his 
disciple. 
In the Lucretian theory the soul is a compound 
1 
SUbstance composed of four ingredients~u~~ or ventus; 
air in motion; vapor or cGlo. heat; a4IJ calm air; and 
1. "De Anima", I, 2. 
- 55 -
2. Burnet, "Early Greek 
Philosophy" 78 
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a fourth constituent that is namelessl . 
The idea that the soul is partially made up of 
air and heat possibly originated in the observation of 
the ceseation of respiration and the loss of the vital 
warmth at death. Lucretius's own statement that when 
death occurs, air is exhaled through the mouth and heat 
is given off in all directions seems to indicate this2, 
for in this passage he is giving a general idea of the 
soul's composition. Things obvious to the senses are 
to Epicurus the foundation of all knowledge and the 
final court of appeal in the search for truth. 
According to Lucretius, air is not a simple 
substance but is composed of, or rather contains, atoms 
given off in the wasting away of all Bubstances. 3 
Between aer and Ventus, there seem to be two or three 
differences. Aer is air at restt and ventus, air in 
motion for Lucretius defines wind as air thoroughly 
agitated. 5 Moreover, ventus is cold6 for it causes 
7 the chill of fear; Galor causee the heat of anger; 
~ belongs to an equable disposit ionS. From this 
1. 
4. 
7. 
232 - 42. 
III, 302. 
III, 294. 
2. 
5. 
121 - 3. 
VI, 6S5. 
'S. jj[,292 - 3, 302. 
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" 1 Giussani draws the conclusion that aer is lukewarm. 
Ventus may have some other distinguishing feature not 
described in the Latin, for Epicurus calls it in Greek, 
There is indication, too, 
that these three substances differ in the size of their 
atoms. 
Lucretius says that these three ingredients are 
not sufficient to create sensation, so it is necessary 
to ascribe to the soul a fourth sUbstance2 . This is 
, 
nameless~ apparently, because there is nothing in nature 
analogous to it. 3 It consists of the smallest and 
smoothest atoms and is the most mobile and subtle of all 
eXisting things. 4 
We have seen above that the soul substance must 
be adapted to its functions. Sensation is motion of tee 
atoms; so also is thought, Hence the substance, which 
initiates the atomic movement that constitutes sensation 
and thought~ is assumed to be exceedingly subtle, The 
fact that the Epicureans postulate a fourth substance 
seems to indicate a partial realization of the greatest 
1. 
2. 
~ \\ 
Glussani, Studi Lucreziani~ 184. 
III~ 238, 42. 3. 242. 
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weakness of Materialism. Someone has remarked that 
nothing is gained by introducing the indefinable to 
elucidate the inexplicable. 
Possibly matter thus refined seemed to the 
ancient mind much like spirit; probably a highly com-
plex composition was thought to increase the capabilities 
of the soul, for Lucretius says that there is nothing 
in nature that consists of a single type of atoms and 
the more powers and properties a thing possesses, the 
more various must be the shapes of its atomsl . 
Every sensation and every mental process begins 
wi th the fourth substa.nce as a mode of motion of its 
atoms. 2 How atomic motion is porpagated from this 
quartessence to the body is explained as follows3 : 
"This (the quarta natura) begins t4e distribution 
throughout the body of sensation-cau~ing motions, for it 
is the first to be stirred up, since it is composed of 
small atoms; theme heat receive~ the motion, then the 
unseen power of Wind and then air; thence everything is 
set in motion, the blood is agitated, then every portion 
1. 
3. 
II, 586 - 8. 
245 - 251. 
2. III 246, 270-2 
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of the flesh thrills with sensation; finally, whether 
the sensation be pleasure or the opposite excitement, 
it is communicated to the bones and marrow last of all~ 
This is simply an application of the theory of 
the mounting upward of motion, described under the 
Kinetics of the Atoml. The motion begins with the 
smallest, most easily moved atoms. (This gives us 
reason to believe that there is a gradation in the size 
of the atoms of the first named three sUbstances). 
After movement has reached the last element of soul, 
it is passed on first to the liquid blood, then to 
the soft flesh, and finally to the rigid bones and 
the marrow protected within them. 
whole frame is enabled to move. 
Thus at length the 
The question of the location of the fourth sub-
stance is one of the most difficult in the entire poem. 
The older commentators without exception con-
fine the fourth substance to the animus. One of the 
passages chiefly responsible for this belief is the 
one in which Lucretius uses the same words in speaking 
of the quartessence that he employs elsewhere in 
1. II, 132 - 141. 
- 59 -
connection "ith the animus. In discussing the functicns 
of the latter, he says "the mind reigns supre e in the 
Ihole body" ,l and, in his description of the fourth sub-
stance, he tells us that it is the very soul of the 2 
whole soul and .!:e.!gn.s ~ullr.§.rne .1h.to~hout_the_ .ho1.e_b.Q.dy~ 
From this coincidence of expression, the inference as 
dra that the guarta natura is either identical with 
the ~ or exclusively confined to it. 
Attention to the context of the second passage 
shows that Lucretius is trying to emphasize the tenuous 
nature of tIe quartessence. In so oing. he ma e a 
com arieon as follo s:3 just a tIe ato of t e 01 
soul, because of their subtle nature, are hi d n among 
the groeser ele~ents of the bo y, so the atom of th 
.uarta natura, because so much finer than other oul 
a oms, are hidden ithin the other three in di t. 
Therefore, uar. t i ta ... i v e - y • t 
oul of the . ole soul. As the cul th 
o y J so the fourth s bete.nce ou!. 
rther ore it 'oul not b in er of Lucr 
to embo'y the thought that th q rt e no b lon 
l. III 138. 2. 279 - 80. 3. 26-
1 
, 
- 60 -
exclusively to the animus in the middle of the para-
graph in which he is explaining the intimate relation-
ship of the four constituents of the soul. 
Heinze and Giussani, working independently, both 
arrived at the conolusion that the fourth substance is 
shared by both the animus and the anima, the former 
containing a greater amount of it in proportion to the 
other ingredients than the latter. 
There are a number of passages that can be 
u..c..t-~ 
addressed to substantiate this interpretation. 
In the first place, Lucretius insists upon the 
close relationship of the four soul substances. They 
are 'mingled and united!l 'The atoms (of the four 
components) run between each other with regular atomic 
movements so that no one element can be segregated or 
exercise its function if separated by space but they 
2 
are, as it were, the several powers of one substanc&' . 
Furthermore 'heat, calm air, the unseen power of wind, 
and that mobile essence ------- all these mingled to-
gether form one substance l , just as warmth, odor J and 
1. III, 258 - 9. 2. 262 - 5. 
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flavor combined enter into the composition of living 
1 flesh. The emphasis upon unity of substance and the 
fact that local separaticn is impossible. point to the 
presence of all four ingredients in both animus and 
aniIra. 
In the second place, Lucretius states that the 
first three substances are not sufficient for creating 
sensation. 2 Furthermore, every sensation begins ith 
t " e Quartessence. 3 Thence the motien that constitutes 
the sensation is transmitted to the ot er tree in order~ 
and thence to the body as we have seen above. 4 
Let us ccnsi_er t is statement in connec ion 
itt ~c others. First of all sensat on ends for the 
most part near the surface of the bo y. 
not include the location of tbe :a~~~ 
ithin the breast. Secondly. an " more 
s tion takes place not in but 
The eye i not a in 0 t ro 
looks out, but the eye itsel. ctu lly 
absolutely nothl to in ieate t. t th 
Th s does 
bleb ituated 
important, 
in th organ. 6 
hic t o 1 
fourth 
1n the ani~us is fire rouee ha t a ion 1 , 
1. 
4. 
266 - 71. 
247 - 51. 
2. 
5. 
III, 238. 
256. 
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6. 3 ... 9 - 369. 
so to speak, telegraphed back to an organ. In fact, 
sensations may be aroused in any portion of the body 
without the mind taking any notice of it. Thus one 
intent upon battle, may continue to fight without 
noticing that his shield and left arm are missing or 
attempt to climb into a chariot after having lost a leg,l 
since the mind notices only what is the object of its 
attention. 2 
Therefore there must be atoms of the quart-
essence in the various parts of the body to enable 
sensation to take place there. Then, too, the argument 
in refutation of Democritus's contention that atoms of 
soul are as numerous as those of body would be meaning-
less if the fourth substanoe were not shared by the 
anima3 . A light touch actually reaches atoms of soul, 
and, since all sensation must begin with the fourth 
substance, Lucretius must mean that atoms of the 
quartessence are wuchedin the part where the sensation 
occurs. 4 
Moreover, living creatures swarm in a dead body 
being produced by spontaneous generation. Their bodies 
3. III 370-395. 
1. 642 - 53. 2. IV, 811 - 813. 
4. 713 - 729. 
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apparently are formed from the disintegrating organic 
matter atoms and their souls from remnants of the soul 
that once inhabited the dead body. Atoms of the fourth 
substance must be present to enable the creature to live. 
That the animus shares the other substances with 
the anima, Lucretius states quite clearly.l 
The ultimate conclusion must be that the aninus 
and anima are both composed of the four ingredients, but 
perhaps in differing proportions for the animus, being 
the seat of intellectual operations, probably ccntains 
a more dense array of atoms of the fourth substance to 
account for the rapidity of thought. 
Lucretius'explanation of differences of te~per­
ament ill~strates some of the changes of meaning through 
which the word ttempera~ent ' has passed. The Latin 
temperamentum originally looked entirely to the phy lcal 
composition of the body, and was a na~e for the various 
ratios between the ele~~nts of any structure. Yet t e 
purely physical as~ect never excluded the ide of 
character, which, thou~h applica le to all thin 8, 
tended to become restricted to psychical character. 
1. 237, 288, 294 - 5, 299. 
4 -
Aristotle along with the ancient art of medicine, 
derived physical and psychical characteristics from the 
mixture of the various constituents of the body, namely 
from heat and cold. We are told in the "De Anima" that 
the attributes of the soul/such as anger and fear, are 
ins eparable from the physical matter of the animals to 
which they belong. For instance, anger would be defined 
by a physicist as a ferment of the blood or heat about 
the heartl. Epicurus was the first to take the step 
of setting up the ratio of the elements of the soul, 
instead of the ratio of the constituents of the body2, 
as a measure for determining the temperaments and 
characters of men. 
" Lucretius teaches that calor, ventus, and aer 
are the determining factors in the character and the 
states of mind of both men and animals3 . 
Apparently the three genera are mingled in such 
a way that one is concealed by another or is more prom-
inent. Giussani thinks that just as the fourth substance 
is concealed by the grosser atoms of the other substance 
each of the latter is in turn hidden by the ingredient 
1. /I .. De An ima , I , 1 . 2. Heinze, Buch III, 89. 
3. III. 288 - 318. 
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that is composed of larger atoms and so on in succession! 
calor by ventus and ventus by a~r, according to the as-
cending scale spoken of in connection with the mounting 
up ard of motion in the soul atoms. 
Ho,ever there is a possible change in the re-
lationship of the atoms, depending not upon size, but 
apparently upon the influence exerted by anyone kind. 
Lucretius says, "There is also that heat 1hicl the mind 
displays when it glows in wrath and when consuming fire 
flashes from the eyes. There is liKewise much cold 
wind, the accompaniment of fear, hich arouses a shud-
-dering in the limbs and shakes the frame; there is also 
that state of quiet air wLich obtains when the breast 
is tranquil and the countenance serene." a 
From Lucretius's st~teroent, it is very di_ficult 
to determine what part the three ingredients play in t e 
pro~uction of states of mind. One's first impres ion is 
that an increase in the number of atoms of any iven 
sUbstance produces a given state of m~ld, and one is . 
more convinced of this after readin the passage on 
temperawents. However Heinze believes t t the pre-
1. III, 283 - 7. 
- 6 
,.. 
G. III, 288 - 93. 
ponderance of anyone constituent is the result and not 
the cause of a given state of mind, since all emotions 
must beg in in the fourth substance. l According to his 
expl anation, anger, arising in the fourth substance, 
woul d call into action heat in particular which would 
cause cer tain bodily symptoms; fear would affect the 
aura which would produce chills in the frame. 
Not only may calor, ventus, and aMr preponderate 
in specific sta tes of mind. There are temperamenta in 
which one is normally in the ascendancy. Calor causes 
or accompanies the leonine disposition, prone to anger;2 
ventus, the timidity so characteristic of deer;3 aer, 
the placid, bovine dispositlon. 4 The same temperamen-
tal characteristics obtain among men also. 5 It is qpi te 
evident that Lucretius associates the qualities which he 
ascribes to the three genera, with the physiological and 
Psychological manifestations in any state of mind or tem-
perarnent. Heat is commonly associated with anger; cold 
and motion, the properties of wind, are well calculated 
to cause shuddering; tranquility and a moderate temper-
l. 
3. 
Buch III, 91. 
299 - 301. 
2. III, 294 - 8. 
4. 302 - 5. 5. 307. 
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ature, the qualities of aer , are suited to a state of 
calmness. 
Lucretius furthermore gives us a single hint 
that minute differences of character depend upon the 
shapes of the soul atomsl . This portion of his theory 
he does not enlarge upon, because the poverty of his 
native tongue does not afford him namee for all the 
various shapes of atoms. 2 Furthermore it does not suit 
his purpose to do so. The ethical conclusion is the 
important matter in Lucretius's estimation. His 
thought is that, whatever may be one's natural pro-
pensities, one can by the study of philosophy so nearly 
eradicate them that it will be possible to lead a life 
worthy of the gods, 
"dignam dis degere vi tam." 3 
The question at. once arises as to' how one could 
overcome his weaknesses, if the victim of anything so 
appare~ly unmanageable as the preponderance of atoms 
of a given shape. The answer probably lies in the ex-
iatence of free-will, which depends upon the power of 
1. 314 - 15. 2. 316 - 18 
3. III. 319 - 22. 
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declination possessed by the soul atoms~ Free-will 
will be treated in the following chapter; it suffices at 
this point to note that in the Lucretian theory, man is 
not the slave of inexorable mechanical laws in the action 
of his mind. Therefore, if a man understands how he 
ought to live, he may be able to encourage desirable 
tendencies and to restrain those that should be checked. 
This apparently is the thought of Epicurus, for he says~ 
"Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young, 
and when he is old, let him not become weary of the 
study, for no man can ever find the time unsuitable or 
too late to study the health of his soul: 2 
1. II, 251 - 93. 2. 
DiogeneS Laertius, X,XXVII, 
letter of Epicurus to Menoec~s. 
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VI. Declination and Free ill. 
To the problem concernino the reasons for the re-
lations of the phenomena in the orld about us there 
are two solutions. The one ascribes all the phenomena 
of the universe to the caprice of one or more deities. 
The other ascribes everything to the operation of im-
mutable laws. l In either case the lot of man is 
laced beyond his control . 
. 
Lucre~us shows ho man in his ignorance of the 
c~use of movements of the heavenly oodies, of the 
c ange of season, and the like, ascribed these phe-
nomena to the gods, and ho superstitious fear reache 
ita culmination in the thought that their po er mi ht 
be unlimited. 2 By his exposition of na ural p ilos-
o y, Lucretius has re oved t 9 go 
influence in nature, but in 0 oin_ h ha 
po er hic might be influence cr1 
b olute ecess1ty. It 1s in the eliver 
from ecessity, that t e t'eory of 
1. Guyau, "La or le 60. 
2. V, 120' - 10. 
- 7 
y 
finds its second applicationl • 
We have already seen how the slight swerving of 
the atoms at quite uncertain times and uncertain places 
rendered possible the combinations of atoms which 
ultimately resulted in the production of the world and 
all it contains. After explaining the bearing of declin-
on 
ation cosmogony, Lucretius accounts for Free Will in man. 
Everything that occurs in Nature must be ex-
pressed in terms of the motion of atoms. Lucretius 
reasons that if anyone motion must always be the result 
of an antecedent motion according to the laws of physics, 
there is no source from which one can derive the action 
of free will which implies in an individual a motion of 
the soul atoms over which the individual can exercise 
Some control. 2 The solution of the difficulty lies in 
the ability of the atoms to swerve. 
Lucretius is thoroughly convinced of the exist-
ence of free will. To prove his point, he appeals to 
personal experience and observation. 
follows: 
He writes as 
1. II, 231 - 93. 2. II, 251 - 60. 
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"For beyond a doubt, the will of each individual 
makes for him a beginning and thence the motion is 
spread throughout the frame. For don't you see that 
at an instant when the barriers are thrown open, the 
eager energy of the horses oan nevertheless not dash 
forth as suddenly as the mind itself desires. For the 
whole mass of matter throughout the entire body must be 
aroused so that, set in motion throughout the frame, it 
may follow with all its might . the desire of the mind; 
so that you know that motion begins from the heart and 
that it first arises from the will of - the mind when it 
is in turn distributed throughout the entire body. It 
is not the same \'V'hen we go forward impelled by a blow of r 
great violence from another and under great compulsion; 
for it is clear that then the entire mass of the whole 
body moves and is hurried along against our will until 
the will restrains it throughout the frame. Do you 
not see then that although an external force impels 
many people and compels them often to go forward and to 
be hurried headlong, there is nevertheless within our 
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breaet something which is able to struggle and make 
resistance? According to the bidding of this also 
the mass of matter is compelled at times to turn its 
Course throughout the body and, though forced on, is 
checked and subsides. For this reason 1n atoms like-
wise, you must admit that there is another cause of 
motion besides liows and weight, whence there is 
originated within us this power, since we see that 
nothing can be ma~e from nothing; for weight forbids that 
everything should be done by blows as by an external 
force; but that the mind itself does not feel an out-
ward compulsion in performing all its actions and be 
enthralled as it were and be compelled to bear and en-
dure, this is caused by the exceedingly slight swerve 
1 
of the primal elements at no certain place or fixed time! 
The illustrations of the action of the will in 
the initiatiDn of movement and in the resistance of 
compulsory motion are very apt. Professor James says 
that the only ends which follow immediately on our 
Willing seem to be movements of our own bodies. Whatever 
1. II, 261 - 95. 
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feelings and havings we may will to get come in as 
results of preliminary movements which we make for 
the purpose .1 
Lucretius considers the fact that no body be-
gins to move at the instant the mind desires, a proof 
that the motion must have a small beginning. His 
idea is of the gradation of a force beginning with the 
smallest soul atoms, those of the fourth substance, 
and mounting upward by the communication of the motion 
to the larger atoms of soul and finally to the body 
according to his formula2 . It is only after this pro-
cess has been completed that a race horse, for instance 
can get under way. 
When,on the other hand a body moves through the 
application of an ou~s ide force, the whole mass moves 
at once. Not only does the individual feel that com-
pulsory motion is something altogether different from 
voluntary movement, but in the case of the former, the 
will finally comes into action and performs a function 
that is exactly the opposite of its office in the 
1. "Principles of Pbycholog~n Vol II, p. 486. 
2. II, 133 - 141, and III, 246 - 51. 
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initiation of movement. Here again the motion has a 
small peg inning and only gradually acquires enough force 
to counteract the momentum of the moving body. 
Inasmuch as free-will occurs in man, Lucretius 
'feels obliged to introduce something to account for it 
into the atoms, since "nothing can come from nothing." . 
Whether the soul atoms move because of gravity or are 
moving because of the blows of other atoms, the movement 
is governed by the laws of mechanics. The swerve on 
the other hand is not so governed. The mind, to which 
free will has to be r eferred, is formulated in ter~s of 
atoms and its action in terms of atomic motion; therefore 
all that is necessary is that the motion of the atoms 
should not be fixed from all eternity. If motion is 
so fixed, the individual is the slave of the mechanical 
laws which govern the operations of his mind; if it is 
not ~o fixed, the activity of the individual is a real 
factor. This is the Epicurean view. Professor Brett 
points out the fact that before the ideas of God and the 
last judgment came in to produce a series of new problems, 
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the question of the freedom of the will was limited to 
the simple problem , ' Am I in my activity a real agent?,l 
Since the time of Lucretius, a number of theories 
have been evolved whi ch ascribe to matter the rudiments 
of consciousness and will. Gassendi believed that a 
weak form of consciousness exists in plants and even in 
inanimate mat ter, particularly in the magnet. A more 
recent development of this idea is Professor Clifford's 
theory of mind stuff, which maintains that mind is made 
up of mind atoms. This theory assuraes that mental 
states are composite in structure, made up of smaller 
states conjoined. Both these theories ascribe to the 
individual constituent elements some measure of the 
power possessed by the whole. 2 
Lucretius certainly does not ascribe to the 
atoms even the rudiments of consciousness. His atoms 
are not only utterly dead, but also endowed with only 
those qualities without which matter would be unthink-
able. Therefore it seems that one who assumes that 
the atoms are possessed of free will or even of anytbing 
1. 
"The Philosophy of Gassendi}"XXXI. 
2. J ames , "Principles of Psychology" 145. 
) 
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analogous to it, goes beyond the thought of Epicurus. 
The entire operation of the rational soul as of the 
irrational, is explained in terms of atomic motion. 
It would seem that the swerve is simply a mechanical 
device introduced to liberate the motion of the soul 
atoms from absolute fixity. 
To ascribe to the atoms such a power as that of 
declination may be an apparent rather than a real contra-
diction to the laws of physics. Lotze, in discussing 
the mechanical theory of the evolution of worlds, 
allows to the elements an inner purposive activity 
which aids in the formation and preservation of thinge. l 
Varisco maintains that the whole world is composed of 
indi~idual centres of spontaneity.2 
Another point that should be noted in connection 
with this subject is the assumed power of the will to 
originate force. 3 The movement begins with the atoms 
of the fourth substance, atoms that are round, smooth, 
and far more tiny than any others, and hence that can 
be moved by the application of an exceedingly slight 
1. "Microcosmus/' 438. 
3. IV, 886 - 91, 898-906 
and II 261-2. 
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force. Thenoe by the principle of the" mounting upward 
of motion l upon which Lucretius lays so much stress, the 
will i s enabled to move the body. The illustration of 
the manner in which the soul moves the bodYI where 
Lucre tius likens the former to the helm that guides the 
huge bulk of a ship, or to the force applied through a 
system of pulleysl is more in harmony with mechanics 
than is the theory of the mounting upward of motion. 1 
In speaking of the conflict thought by many to 
exist between the laws of physics and the doctrine of 
free 'ivill, Sir Oliver Lodge saysl "Life is something 
outside the scheme of mechanics - outside the categories 
of matter and energy; though it can nevertheless control 
or direct material forces, timing them and determining 
their point of applicationl subject always to the laws 
of energy and all other mechanical laws; supplementiDg 
or accompanying these laws, therefore, but contradicting 
or traversing them not a whit! 2 His contention is that 
whereas life or mind can neither generate energy nor 
directly e ert force, yet it can cause reatter to exert 
2. "Life and Matter/" 138. 
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force on matter, ans so can exercise guidance or 
control ; it can prearrar-ge the position of existing 
material and time the liberation of existing energy 
i n any scene of activity, so as to produce certain 
des~red results. l The difficulty of the question comes 
back to the origin of will. What starts the impulse 
is as yet unanswered, but that the problem is simpli-
fied by the fact that the work concomitants of the 
energy needed in the performance of any act are equally 
present, whether it be so arranged as to produce any 
predetermined effect or not2 • 
The part played by atomic declination in the 
creation of the world and its bearing upon free will 
have been noted. In both its applications, this device 
seems simple# efficacious# and ingenious. It is, hoVl-
ever, far more difficult to jecide how far declination 
i s manifested in Nature than to understand what it is 
intended to accomplish. 
Apparently this power is conceived of as 
present in all atoms at the creation, and it is con-
stantly being displayed in the action of the mind. 
1. Ibid, 143. 2. Ibid, 147-8. 
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The problem that presents itself, then, concerns the 
continued maniiestation or disappearanoe of declination 
in the world about. 
One of the most remarkable answers to this 
question is t hat of M. Guya~.l His belief is that 
declinat i on continues to manifest itself in Nature as 
"Spontaneity" in things. As manifested in the mind 
atoms the power to swerve results in freedom of the 
will;as revealed in the world of inanima~e objects, it 
amounts to Chance. He combats the idea that the power 
of declination was ascribed to the atoms at the beginn-
ing and then withdrawn for, he says, Necessity would 
have clasped the universe afresh2 . The continued 
manifestation of the ability of the atom to swerve is 
the only possible interpretation of the theory in the 
eyea of M. Guya~ . After speaking of freedom of the 
will in man, he says, "The same power i8 found, as we 
have seen, in other living things (animantibus). 
Finally it is perhaps not foreign even to inorganic 
bodies or more or less to their primal elements 113. 
1. / "La Morale d' Epicure/' Chapi tre II, "La Cont ingence 
,/ dans la Nature, Condition de la Libe r te Humainel 
2 . p. 86 . 3. "La Morale d t Epicure," 89 - 90. 
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Then he quotes the passage of Lucretius to the effect 
that to an observer heavy bodies do not seem to swerve 
in falling although one cannot implicitly trust his 
obser vat10nl. Instead of interpreting this statement 
as an illustration, by analogy, of the slightness of the 
swerve of the atoms, M. Guya~ understands Lucretius to 
mean that heavy bodies may possess this power in some 
mea sure. He states ~is belief as follows: 
"So, following this somewhat naive conception, 
even before our eyes, even in the midst of the coarsest 
aggregations of matter, spontaneity may yet have a place, 
if not in the mass, at least in the elements; it may 
even man '::' fest itself by a movement real, though insens-
ible, by a disturbance of which the effect will appear 
only in the course of time. Everywhere where atoms 
are found, in exterior objects as in us, there may be 
found the power more or less 1a ten t, of breaking 1.ec-
essity; and because outside the atom, there is nothing 
but void, nowhere will there reign an absolute and 
elementary necessity; the free will which man possesse~ 
will exist in all the elements of things, in a lower de~ree 
1. II, 246 - 50. 
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but always ready to awaken, to act, if it encounters 
favorable combinations like those which result in a 
l ' , 1 ~v~ng being l an animal or a man~ This power, 
M. Guya~ thinks, will always work in harmony with 
Nature and never against it. Furthermore, this theory 
provides for a wonderful solidarity bet een man and the 
~orld a out him,2 - the most striking and most original 
pOint in what M. Guya~ deems to be the Epicurean theory 
of declination. 
by all nature. 
The esca~e from necessity is shared 
A very detailed criticism of M. Guyau's theory 
is given by Mr. Masson3 . ~e objects to the inter-
pretation of the p SQ ge on the s erving of heavy bo'ies 
u on which . Guyau's theory is very largely based. 
Furtnarmore, Spontaneity woul~ be just as liable to 
work against nature as in harmony ith it an it might 
easily result in a disruption of the la s of ature. 
Such a po er, by very slightly disturbing an equilib-
rium of forces, might result in tre endou8 consequences, 
such as the liberation of volcanic ener y, or test rt-
1. liLa orale d'Epicure)" 90. 2. p. 98. 
3. 
"Lucretius) Epicurean and Poet)" Compl er t ry Vol. 62-95. 
ing of an avalanche. The idea that the results of 
Spontaneity would appear only after a long time, appears 
untenable to Mr. Ha.ason. This author does not maintain 
that the power of declination absolutely passes out of 
existence. His explanation is that the soul atoms, or 
to be more explicit, the atoms of the fourth substance, 
because of their extreme lightness and mobility, <mtinue 
to manifest this ability, whereas in aggregations of 
gross matter, the pow'er is nullified, the 6wel'ving of 
one atom counteracting that of another. 
One may find M. Guyau's theory of spontaneity 
untenable as an interpretation of the teachings of 
Epicurus and Lucretius, but philosophers of the present 
time holi a somewhat similar sort of view. This modern 
theory regards spontaneity as the condition or funda-
mental constituent of the rJality of objectsl , and the 
\7hole world as composed of spontaneous centres of 
activity. Spontaneity is produced by necessity. If 
happenings are to take place, there must be absolute 
beginnings. Necessity does not determine the beginnines; 
1. Var isco, "The Great Problems)" 218. 
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what is necessarily deterr1lined cannct.;be a true beginning. 
Necessi ty determines that .there must be beginnings; it 
determines the centres of spontaneityl. The centres of 
spontaneity are bound together by logical relations, 
but are nevertheless endowed with a certain independ-
ence. Spontaneity gives rise to a happening that is 
not the consequence of another happening. The deter-
ruination of facts cannot be absolutely rigoroua2 . 
Varisco says, "There is in facts an element of deter-
minism, logical relations, without which no causal con-
nection would be possible. But there is also in facts 
a non-logical, indeterministic element - a spontaneity 
wi thou t which there would be no happening:' . a By this 
theory the individuality of things is enabled to escape 
general laws and every individual, so far as it is 
individual, is outside the reach of strict determination 
and is therefore quite forcibly self determined. a This 
individuality of things is identified with the source of 
life and movement. 
1. 
3. 
Varisco shows how in inorg~nic bodies, the 
Ibid., 239. 2. Ibid" 218. 
Varisco, "The Great Problemst 247. 
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connection between the grouped centres of spontaneity is 
not of such a character that their spontaneities are ex-
cited either to become intensified or to express them-
selves in one way rather than another. Hence spontaneity 
is concealed and in purely physical happening 1 in so far 
as it is observable, there appears no certain sign of the 
elements of spontaneity which are included in it. The 
body as a whole lacks purposefulness. l On the other 
hand in an organism, the purposeful operations of the 
individual centres can interfere so that a purposeful 
variation of the system results from it. 
The disappearance of spontaneity in the inorganic 
~orld and its pronounced activity in the organic corres-
ponds somewhat closely to the interpretation of the 
Epicurean theory, according to which the power of de-
clination is nullified in atoms which compose gross 
matter. 
1. Ibid., 248. 
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VII. The Theory of Emanations. 
Part I, Nature of the Emanations. 
According to the theory of the atomists, all 
influence of one thing upon another is of a mechanical 
nature and consists of pressure and percussionj there-
fore any dynamical influence, though apparently pro-
duced from a distance, must be of a mechanical nature 
and caused by theootual contact of atoms. This is the 
reasoning that lies at the basis of the theory of 
emanations, which Epicurus borrowed from Empedocles. 
This hypothesis is, in many ways, equivalent to the 
modern theory of the interaction of bodies by means 
of ether vibrations. 
The very extensive use, made of the doctrine 
of images or effluxes, not only in the explanation of 
of sense perception, but also of the higher intellectual 
processes, shows how completely psycholobY is a branch 
of physics in the Epicurean 9yste~. 
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Lucretius tells us that films or emanations are 
constantly being given off from the surf&ce of all 
things. l These are something like a membrane or rind 
because they preserve the shape and appearance of the 
object from which they are thrown off. The proof used 
by Lucretius is an excellent illustration of the char-
acteristically Epicurean method of reasoning from what 
is Obvious to the senses to what is unknown, and is as 
follows: A nwnber of visible Objects display this 
power in a very tangible form. Wood emits smoke and 
fires, heat; cic~dae and snakes shed their skins. If 
films of such gross texture can be thrown off, why is 
it not far more reasonable to believe that objects are 
able to give off those that ar,e exceedingly delicate?2 
Lucretius goes on to prove that such tenuous 
films emanate from things by the fact that when the sun 
shines upon the awning over a theatre, the seats and 
audience below are dyed with color. 3 Since the images 
reflected in water, a mirror or any other shining sur-
face, have exactly the appearance of the objects the~-
1. IV. 42 - 43. 2 . IV. 54 - 66 
3. 75 - 83. 
- 87 -
I 
I 
selves, Lucretius concludes that the images must actually 
come from the objectsl. 
Lucretius thinks that the atoms at the extreme 
surface of an object will not be impeded in detaching 
themselves from the body, as would those within, and will 
therefore withdraw, maintaining the same relative pos-
ition that they had while a part of the object. 2 
The tenuous character of the films is illustrated 
by the fact that a single film would . make no impression 
upon an organ of sense~ Only upon the eye of the soul, 
BO to speak, could a single ~imu~aQrum make an impress -
ion4. There seem to be two clasees of images, those 
that are thrown off from the surface of things and those 
that are formed spontaneously in the air. 5 The latter 
are combinations of the images of things actually exist-
ing6 . No such creature as a Centaur ever existed, but 
one may see a Centaur in imaginaticn, because the simu-
lacrum of a horse may chance to combine with that of a 
man. 7 These films are less stable than the others and 
are comparable to the fantastic shapes sometimes assumed 
1 • .rt 98 - 101. 
4. 89 - 101-2. 
2. 
5. 
67 - 9. 3. 
IV. 129-31. 6. 
7. 739 - 43. 
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I by the clouds. l 
The images fly about, passing through conntless 
others, but they remain unharmed, until they meet with 
an obstacle. When they encounter substances such as 
glass, the pores of which are straight, they pass through 
unharmed;2 but when the opposing object is like wood or 
stone, which have intricate passages between their atoms, 
the films are torn;3 if the images strike against a 
mirror which is both dense and shining, they neither 
pass through nor are destroyed,4 but are flattened out 
straight backward like a wet plaster mask dashed against 
a post,S that is they are reflected. 
The velocity of images is enormous. There are 
a number of proofs of this. However quickly you place 
any Object before a mirror, the image appears. This 
can be accomplished only by the image striking the 
mirror and rebounding. 6 Lucretius constantly appeals 
to mirror refleciion in the course of his argument. 
Just as the sun must shed much light in an instant of 
time in order that all things may continually De full 
of it, so in a similar manner images must be carlied 
1. 'J£. 133 - 40. 
3. 147-9. 
5. 294-97. 
2. 
4. 
6. 
146-7, Reading vitru~ instea4 of 
vestem I and 601-2. 
150-4. 
155-6. 
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I off from objects in an instant of time, many in number, 
in many ways in all directions".l This is proved by 
turning a mirror which reflects the object from differ-
ent angles, instantaneously.2 One of the most conclus-
ive proofs is the fact that as soon as one places a dish 
of water out of doors, the image of the heavens appears 
in the water. This, Lucretius thinks, is caused by an 
image which descends from the sky, and traverses an en-
ormous distance in an instant of time. 3 
Besides these images which cause ocular vision, 
ther~ are others of much finer texture4 , so tenuous that 
they can be perceived only by the eye of the soulS. 
OWing to their very subtle character, they are able to 
pass through the pores of the body and reach the animus 
Within, thus producing thought as we shall see. 6 
Here a serious difficulty presents itself in re-
gard to the composition of these very subtle films. 
Since we can think of any object, all things must give 
off films. The images which cause vision are, we sup-
pose, composed of the ordinary atoms which make up the sub-
1. 
4. 
IV. 161-5. 
728, 756. 
2. 
5. 
166-7. 
746 - 748. 
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3. IV. 211-15. 
6. 730 - 31. 
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stance. We know that rock and iron for inetance, are 
composed of large, hooked atome. How can such subetan-
ces throw off exceedingly tenuous images? Any object 
t hat we think of, has the same attributes in our thought 
that it has when viewed by the eye. Therefore the 
atoms of the film which causes thought muet be exactly 
Similar in form, have the eame arrangement, and be en-
do wed with the eame vibrations as the atoms of the image 
which affects the eye. No satisfactory explanation of 
the composition of the exceedingly subtle images is 
g iven. All that Lucretius tells us is that they are 
of finer texture than the others. 
Furthermore, we are told that idols must either 
come from something existing, or be formed by the com-
bination of two or more images of actual objects. l How 
can this be reconciled with the fact that one is able to 
think or dream of friends long since dead? 
We never actually see those who are no longer 
living. This means that there are no longer a suffic-
ient number of films, which emanated from them, to cause 
1. IV. 129-32. 
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vision. For this a succession of images is necessaryl. 
It is however l conceivable that a few images might per-
rish for a long period of time and might traverse great 
distances. 
or a dream. 2 
A single such image could cause a thought 
One of the greatest difficulties in the theory of 
images is the question of the motive force which enables 
the idols to move. Lucretius compares them to the 
light and heat of the sun which come from the intericr 
of that body, but nevertheless travel with great velocity 
and he says that images which are very light and which 
come from. the surface of things should travel still more 
rapidly.3 Possibly he thinks of the images as borne on 
by the motion of their atoms. 
Furthermore the images push the air before them 
instead of passing through it.4 Masson· thinks that 
their extreme velocity enables them to do this. 
The theory of emanations is in harmony with 
Lucretius's statement that all things are losing a 
portion of their substaLce. This is illustrated by the 
r.--. 1. JJt.. 105-6. 2. 746-7. 3. IV. 185 - 208. 
4. 246-7. 
2 -
explanation of the composition of the air. This is 
said to be constantly receiving atoms given off from 
substances l and again the world as a whole is losing 
substance and will eventually pass away.2 
It is interesting to note that Aristotle severely 
criticises Denocritus in regard to the theory of effluxes. 
In the first place he objects to the reduction of all the 
sensations to toudh,3 and postulates instead of effluxes, 
a medium through which sensation can be caused4 . further-
more, to Aristotle, the idea that the shape of atoms can 
cause qualitative differences in sounds, colors, odors, 
and flavors seems absurd5 . 
Much of the apparent absurdity of the theory of 
emanations has been removed by the discovery of radio-
activity. 
1.V. 273 - 80. 2. II. 1144 - 9. 3. "De Sensu~ III. 
4. Ibid. 5. "De Sensu" IV. I 
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Part 2, Sense Perception. 
In the psychology of Lucretius, the human intel-
ligence is regarded as the complex product resulting 
from the sensations. Hence to sensation or the mater-
ial for intellection, LucretiuB devotes considerable 
attention. The processes of elaboration, he neglects 
almost entirely. 
Lucretius makes more provision for the special 
sensations, those of the five senses, than for general 
ones, such as tingling, shivering and certain muscular 
sensations such as cramp. It is the special eensations 
tha~rgrdinarilY brought about by the action of external 
agents lying outside the organism, for which reason they 
are spoken of as sense-impressions and are peculiarly 
fitted to yield knowledge of the external world. Accord-
ing to our theory, these impressicns lie at the basis of 
the intelligence. 
Of the five senses, four only, sight, hearing, 
taste, and smell, are specifically discussed by Lucret4us. 
- ~ -
Touch, he scarcely mentions as such, apparently be-
cause he regards all the sensations as a species of 
touch. l Emanations from objects come in contrast with 
atoms of the fourth substance in the organ that is so 
constructed as to absorb and respond to the particular 
material constituents of the emanation. Each organ of 
sense has a special province of its own. In general 
there must be a certain strength of the impression, that 
is, a certain lower limit to the number of permeating 
atoms; in the case of sight, a succession of images2 , 
and the shape and size of the atoms must be such that 
they can gain admission to a speoial organ of sense. 3 
Luoretiusts explanation of visicn would be as-
tounding, if we were to forget his fundamental material-4 
istic principles. He begins his exposition as follows: 
nMoreover since a shape handled in the darkness is 
reoognized to be the same which is seen in the bright 
radience of light, touch and sigbt must be produced by 
Now, therefore, if we touch a square 
a similar cause. 
and it impresses us in the darknesS", what square thing 
1. 
3. 
II, 434 - 5. 
489 - 95. 
2. 
4. 
IV, 89 and 257-8. 
230 - 6. 
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could inipinge upon the sight except the image of it 
\I (of the square)? Sight and touch /then, are caused in 
the same way, by actual contact with an object. 
The emanations which preserve the shape and 
appearance of an object enter the eyes and cause vision; 
without them it would be impossible to see l . The 
idols not only enable one to see an object, but also 
to judge of its distance from the observer? The 
image pushes before it the air intervening between it 
and the observer. This air passes through the eyes 
along with the idol and in so doing brushes the pupil. 
The latter enables one to see the object; the air, to 
judge the distance. The more air thus comes in con-
tact with the eyes, the farther distant the object 
appears to be. One is inclined to ask what becomes of 
the enormous quantity of air and film atoms that pass 
into the eyes. Lucretius evidently thinks of all 
substances as more or less porous. The eyes are so 
and give a free egress to the atoms under ordinary 
conditions. ° 
1. P. 238. 2. 244 - 255. 
3. IV, 719-21. 
9.6 -
I 
I Bright light causes a painful sensation because 
it contains atoms of fire. l The light of the sun can-
not be looked at steadily because its idols gain momen-
tum in falling toward the earth and therefore meet the 
eyes with considerable impact. 2 An emanation from the 
eyes may affect the incoming image, as in the case of 
jaundice, where atoms of yellowness maet with the idols 
and change the appearance of an object in respect to 
color. 3 The appearance of a distant object depends 
somewhat upon an alteration in the image in transmission. 
Thu8 a square tower, when viewed from a diste.nce, appears 
to be round because the angles of the image are worn off 
by friction with the air.4 
The 0 ther sensations, soun __ , tae te, and smell, 
are caused by contact of certain atoms with the organa 
of sensation. Lucretius has a number of arguments to 
prove the corporeal nature of sound. The basic proof is, 
of course) the principle t hat whatever acts oT is acted 
r.; 
Upon is material.~ In the second place, sounds abrade 
the t hroat6 and long continued discourse weakens the body 
/, 
1. Jj::·304-6. 
4. 353 - 361 
2. 
5. 
299 - 303. 
526 - 7. 
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3. 
6. 
307 - 11 
IV. 528. 
, by removing a portion of its substance. 1 Harshness or 
agreeableness of sound depends ~pon the shape of the 
atoms emitted. 2 
The tongue and lips render speech articulate so 
that if the distance between the speaker and the auditor 
is short, the thought is understood. 3 Passage through 
much air, however, render s the words confused. 4 One 
of the moat peculiar ideas in connection with hearing 
is the statement that one utterance divides itself into 
many, the parts still remaining articulate. This is 
why any number of people can hear the same sound. 5 
We hear with the ears because they are the organs 
upon which the emanations ,that we call sounC, are able 
to produce an effect. 
Taste is caused when, in mastication, one presses 
foo1 with the tonb~e.6 Atoms of flavo r , as Lucretius 
says, pass through the pores of the loose-textur ed ton-
gue and excite sensation,7 - in the fourth substance of 
the anima. 
If smooth atoms penetrate, t he taste is agreeable; 
1. 
4. 
7. 
t!535-40. , 
557 - 62. 
680-21. 
2. 531-41-46. 
5. 563- 569. 
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3. 
6. 
547-56. 
617-18. 
if irregular or hooked ato~s enter, t'e resulting sens-
ation is disagreeable, t'e flavor being sharp or bitter. l 
oreover, the same food may be pleasin_ to one indivi ual 
and distasteful to another, while one man's me t may be 
another's poison. 2 The expl~~ation given oy Lucretlu 
is as follows: The atomic co position of any t 0 people 
is not exactly the same3; the ~ifference in the compo ition 
0; animals of dif~erent spec'es must be much gre t r. If 
t ' e atoms of the tongue n palate lffer in s a.e 
size, their paths of vi ration and their motions ust 
i~fer ani consequently the inte stices bet e n the, 
hich constitute t.e porea. These ap rt are of 
var ous sizes and geo etr c figures in di 
Idua~. If a foo an ree ble fl 
t in per OL or 1, this s1 ply ean 
of the to.gue and p 1 te of 
a apes t at only t e smoot , round 
I t e ubatance haa a bl~in or 
1 re rly shape 
1 cer te the edg 
1. .li, 622-26. 
6 .,-57. 
ato p throu h an 
of the p re .6 
2. 
5. 
633-37. 
658 - 60 
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6 - 62. 
There is no-
substances eontain variously shaped atoms. 
thing that is not formed from a mingling of elements. l 
Even honey is not composed entirely of smooth and round 
atoms .2' One individual may be fond of honey because 
his tongue and palate admit only the smooth atoms; 
another may find it disagreeable because his orga~ of 
This same 
taste admits the jagged elements likewiae. 
theory explains why goats grow fat on hellebone, which 
is deadly to man,3 and why food which is agreeable in 
health may be distasteful in illness, for disease dis-
orders the arrangement of the atoms1 
Aside from the great difficulty that attends the 
explanation of all the sensations5 , there is another of 
It is easy to see why large irregular 
minor importance. 
atoms should be excluded from pores of certain shapes and 
sizes, but there seems to be no reason why small smooth 
Possibly 
atoms should not enter where large ones can. 
the explanation is that thsre is no substance of unalloysd 
bitterness. 
1. 
4. 
Odor likewise consists of particles given off 
~. 
II 383 - 84. 2~67l-2. 3. 640 - 41. 
664 - 670 5. Vide infra. 
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fr~m substances. The peculiar vocabulary Lucretius 
uses in speaking of odor, seems to indicate that he 
believed that the particles must be in a state of 
motion in order to be detected. He usesthe terms 
~~i~~t~s odor is, fluctus o doruID , fluens, volvat, 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - --
~~t~~ and ~~~g1. In this explanation Lucretius is 
correct. 
Small, too, is a selective process. The agree-
ableness of an oior depends upon the shape of its com-
ponent atoms, and their relation to the shape and size 
of the pores of the nostrils. The sense of smell 
enables each animal to find the food that is suitable for 
it. 
Lucretius dwells at length upon the selective 
element in taste and smell and then says that the same 
is true of vision, Thus certain colors and objects of-
fend the eyes of some animals. For instance a lion 
cannot endure the si;ht of a cock because there are in 
the latter atoms of such a character that they lacerate 
the eyes of the lion, while these same atoms do not 
offend hunan eyes, eitner because they do not enter or 
- 101 -
or because their egress is not hindered. l 
The explanation of the cause of sensation helps 
us to understand the functions of the anima. Whatever 
causes a sensation, whether it be a series of idols that 
strike the eye, or atoms of food in contact with the 
tongue, sets in motion the atoms of the fourth substance 
in the &nima, and this motion is in turn conveyed to the 
other three ingredients in order and then to the organ? 
The sensatio~ is primarily a physiological process, but 
the animus in its central position is aware of the 
sensation unless its attention is fixed else~here3, 
Hence t:he anima plays an important part in gathering 
material for the animus to elaborate, for iVe shall see 
that Lucretius regards sense perception as the basis of 
all knowledge. 
A modern psychOlogist4 says, "All intellectual 
activity is carried out upon and so involves sensations, 
that is, t he psychOlogical results of sensory stimulations, 
either in their original form as presentative elements, 
e.g., impressions of color, or as worked up into what 
1. 
3. 
IV. 706 - 2l. 
III. 642 - 53. 
2. III 246 - 8 and 359 - 61. 
4. Sully, "Outlines of Psychology," 
p. 37. 
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are knO\7n as representations (images~ ideas). 
Accordingly intellection may be said to be specially 
related to sensory processes~ . 
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Part 3 - The Intellectual Processes. 
Lucretius'a tre tment of the intellectual pro-
cesaes can scarcely be calle j a theory because of lts 
meagreneaa . Hia purpose in treating psychology i8 to 
give a scientific explanation of drea a, visions, and 
all ~.enomena of a terrifying nature an" to remove the 
fe r of a future life by proving that the oul oi 
ortalj not ri ar11y to expoun the operation of th 
mind. 
Furthermore, e oelieve trAt Epicur h 
or e out no detailed theory. In spea 1ng of 
min I he says, " e have still res-ter n e of oorr et 
notion cf the hol than e ve even of 
underst n in of etail n, 
to eeire t i impos ible t 
ciate unlfor eory abou 
Ho ever t. e mast rl 
of 0 o e Ii t 
i eip e. T e et ic'" 1 part of pieur 
Dio nee L ertiuB, ,24. 1cur l. 
2. Diogenes Laertius, X, 25. Epieuru 
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try t o realize the nature of things the evidence of 
which is not immediate. l This seems to be what is 
meant by the singular expression iniectus ~~!~~2, a 
' throwing on of the mind', to form a concept. Again 
Lucre tius saya that the ~~~m~ !a2tu§3 flies on and 
t ries to realize the nature of infinite space. 4 It 
appears that in this process of forming such a concept 
the r eason plays an important part. For instance, the 
a t oms which are intellectually conceived, have precisely 
t he same qualities as the bodies which are sensibly 
perceived when we deduct from the latter all which can 
be shown to be the eff ect of a combination of circum-
stances. The intellect is only a subtler and more 
far reaching sense. 5 
A detailed discussion of the tests of truth is 
out s ide the plan of Lucretius's poem, but he doea treat 
of the senses as the final court of appeal. He writes 
as follows: "Finally, if anyone thinks that nothing can 
be known, he does not know w~ether that also can be 
known, since he confesses that he knows nothing!6 . 
1. Di ogenes Laertiu6, X, 24. 2. II, 740. 
3. II, 1047. 4. U~son, 252, Giussani, I, 271 
5. Wallace ,1/ Epicureanism,\\ p. 94. 6. IV, 469-70. 
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Obviously one holding such views can know nothing about the 
test of truthl. Then comes the statement that the concept 
of truth is created from the senses fdrst of all and that 
the senses cannot be deceived2 • Reason cannot be the 
criterion, for reason is founded on sense perception, 
and, if this is unreliable, the reasoning will not be 
valid3. Moreover, in the case of optical illusions, the 
vision is not at fault. When one is on a movin~ vessel 
the shore seems to be gliding by and the ship to be stald-
ing stil14. To a child giddy from whirling about, the 
~alls of the room seem to be revolving. 5 Yet the 
The mind is simply draw-
senses are not in the wrong? 
in~ an incorrect inference7 • 
In all this, Lucretius is followin; very exactly 
the teachings of Epicurus. 8 Aristotle, too, recog-
nized the perception of objects of t e special senses 
as true or subject to a minimum of error. 9 
Lucretius treats of the mind as the organ of a 
sixth sense .lhich, like the others that have been dis-
cussed, parta~e8 of the nature of touch. 
1. J!475-6. 2. 478-9. 3. 48 -
4. 387 ~ 90. 5. 401-3. 6. 435. 
7. 464-8. 8. Diogenes Laertius x,XXIV, 
9. nDe Anima" III, 3. I 
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other grotesque creaturel,simply because the images 
of several animals have become combined. 2 We never see 
such things with the eye because they do not exist3 and 
what does not exist cannot throw off a succession of 
films to cause vision, but a single idol formed from 
the combinations of an image of a horse and of a man 
can enable the mind to see a CentauYin imagination. 
During sleep, the functions of the anima are 
suspended4, but those of the animus may continue, so 
that an individual dreams5 , In his discussion of the 
operations of the mind, Lucretius lays great stress upon 
dreams, as Giussani says,6 not for the sake of analogy, 
but because "dreaming is thought par excellence; it is 
thinking not obscured by sensation." Dreams are caused 
by images which penetrate to the mind. 7 Therefore 
dreaming is a natural and not a supernatural phenomenon . 8 
In dreams one seems to see those that have long been 
dead, because the criteria of the senses .cannot show the 
error and furthermore, the memory is not in operation. 9 
Hence , while dreams are thought, Lucretius does not 
~ 1. ~.731-2. 2. 741-3. 3. 
IV, 740. 
III, 112-13. 5. III, 114-16 and IV, 758. 4. 
6. Vol. 3. p. 289. 7. 757-9. 8. 762. 
9. 762-7. 
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I 
asoribe to them any value in the recognition of the 
truth. 
If in our thoughts or dreams, objects seem to m 
move, it is because a succession of images is supplie I 
eaoh in a different position from the one before itl, 
The principle of the clnematogr~ph is hat Lucretius 
he-s in mind. 
Our author asks a nu ber of very diff oult 
questions conce ning the mental processes; some of t em 
he does not ana er, possioly bec use portion of t 
Fourth Book are in an unrevised con ition. .. y ", 2 
sir ? II 
asks, " does tte mind think of h t ver t 
ny oan e t. ink of sea , earth, hea en , 
,a eante, ban ets, or ga e I e peoial1y 
in the same vicinity are tb1 1ng of 0 
the sa e moment 3 Do e dre m 0 a g 
r 
of i ols have been taug t 0 rfor number 
espeoial amusement? 4 
The last uestlon 1 1 re d 
Lucreti 's expl na·lon i o 10 
1. IV, 768-76. 2. 767-80. 
3. 
4. 788-91. 
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period of time, let us say the len~ th of time it 
takes to utter a single word> there are many rational 
divisions in which images may come to the mind. One 
of these, the mind of one individual selects; another 
person selects another. The tremendous num rer of 
images enables differe~ people to entertain diverse 
thoughts. 1 The highly important question that is 
disregarded is why the mind accepts one image rather 
t han another . 
At this point Lucretius trea~ s of attention. 
This is awakened by the initial image of any serios 
that infringe upon the mind. "Because the images 
are 8 0 tenuous IJ, Lucretius says, II the mind cannot see 
clearly any exce9t those it strives to see: accrrdingly 
all images come to nau~ht except those which the mind 
has prepared itself to see. It prepares itself ~ore-
2 
over and expects to see what follows on each thing ll 
To prove the truth of his assertion, Lucretius appeals 
to experience and reminds us that the eyes do not 
perceive those oojects that are almost invisible, un-
1. ~ ~ .. 794-99. 2. IV. 802-6. 
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less they make an effort. Furthermore, if we do not 
fix the attention upon objects within our field of 
vision, it 1s as though they were not present. There-
fore it is not surprising that the mind loses all the 
images outside the range of the attention at any given 
It is easy to understand why the mind should 
moment l . 
notice a succession of similar ima~es if the attention 
were ~nce fixed, but this brings useack to the selection 
of the initial image of a series. The importance of 
this question will appear later. 
The initiation of an action, Lucretius goes on to 
explain, "I say that images of walking occur to the mind 
Thence arises the 
and strike it as I have said above. 
will. For no one begins to do anything before the mind 
sees in a nticipa tion what it wishes. That which the 
mind sees in anticipation is the image of that act. 
Then, when the mind arouses itself to wish to step or 
advance, it i mmediately strikes the soul which is in 
the entire body, scattered througl its members. That 
is easy for the mind to do since it is held closely 
1. ::nt:.807 - 15. 
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connected with the soul. Then that (the soul) 1n turn 
strikes the body and so gradually the hole ma e 1 
pushed for ard and move II 1 
It has been noted that the 111 resi es 1n t.e 
fourth subst nee. Thie 1s the flrst ccnst1tuent of 
2 
the soul to be set in mot10n by an ima e. The tr 10n 
of the motion of ~:e move ent of the ato s of t e 
ence to the other in redlents of the soul an fi ally ~o 
the boAy is an application of t e t eo-y of ount-
ing upwar of motion. 3 T e process i b -
-in as a psychical st te and end in he of 
phy 1010gy 0_ per ps ore correctly, 1n t t 0 
Il echanice. 
o ever t e i crt t u t10n fro e 
oin 
of v ie of t.e lntellectu 
g 
of t e 11l. At first t 
to reoo c le the freedo ot he 
arrival of an 1mage . 
dl! ioulty 11es in th 
e are co t tly surroun e . et r 
00 
l. I , 881-92 2. III, 2 6. 3 
0 
II, 
4. ' 880, , "Lucret1 8, c re n 
a 2S 
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to accept a certain image rather than another) or 
whethe r the mind chooses to respond to the suggestion 
of a certain image is not quite clear. If the latter 
is the case> freedom of the will can be displayed in 
the choice between two possible courses of action. 
With the explanation of the action of the will, 
Lucretius's discussion of the operations of the mind 
is almos t completed. 
Let us grant for a moment the correctness of his 
beliefs and ascertain how far he goes toward covering 
the ground of psychology. Lucretius explains the 
structure and functions of the animus and animal) which 
correspond very roughly to the brain and nervous system. 
Sensation is discussed in some detail, but the reader 
is left to infer the connection between the sensation 
taking place in some organ and the animus. The form-
ation of concepts by means of tenuous ima6es is ex-
plained, but the iniectus aniwi or formation of the 
concept of something not evident to the senses, is 
passed over in silence. Reason and memory are merely 
mentioned. The attention receives some discussion, as 
1. 
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has been noted above. Imaginati~a impressions are 
to be taken as literally impressions of images upon the 
mind, and therefore affects of material agencies and 
expressed in terms of atomic motion. There is a sli~ht 
trace of a less materi~listic view in the concession 
that the mind can reach out beyond the known. Temper-
aments and states of minj are treated together with the 
bearing upon them of hertdity. Educaticn, that is, the 
study of philosophy, is considered of gre~t importance 
in overcoming undesirable propensities. How this is 
accomplished, we are not told. In8tincts are merely 
mentioned. 
The entire theory of images, including the mental 
phenomena based upon it, is beset with many difficulties. 
Those that concerned the production and kinetics of the 
idols have been mentioned. 
In the first place it is difficult to understand 
how an image retaining the shape of the object from 
which it emana ted, can enter the eye, still le8s the mind, 
since Lucretius tells us that if the i . ages are torn or 
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even suffer a lOBS of sharpness of det 11 hile pas 1ng 
through the air, we either do not see the object30r se 
it indistinctly.l 
A question arises also in regard to t e -1 of 
images which arouse the Will. Lucretius s eake of 
'idols of alk1n .' (3 hether t~is means t~at an 
of a alk1n i ~ividual catc es the attention and co 
the iea~ of performing the same act, or t t ther ar 
not otherwise provided for in the theory, can 0 
deter ined. 
The di ficulty increa e a on 
the mental represent ion 0 concr t 
idea of abstract qual tie . 
Furt_ermore, sen tion hou ht 
~ 
eX.l in d in tar f otion of th ~ 
to the kinetic theory. hy 
ro 
t 
lob 
of 
y org n by 1c 1ma caused in 
ul r ty e of 
terpr t 
or ta te is 
fro 
i!""lcu .. t 
1. lL. 356 - 61. 2 . 
n 
r 
88 . 3. I . 
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settled even today in regard to the nervous system. 
Then, too, reasoning, memory, and the imaginative out-
breaking of the mind are all modes of motion of the a-
toms of the animus. It would seem that these processes 
together with the analysis and synthesis involved, . must 
be some secondary motion of the atoms, but the theory of 
kinetics makes no provision for such an explanation. 
Much has been said in criticism of the reduction of 
psychical processes to terms of modes of movement of 
material particles. However, Ostwald, in "Die Phil-
osophie der Werte/' expresses the belief that all 
Psycho-physical energy can be re duced to the terms of 
psysico-cheffii cal energy,-something in fact very like 
motion of the atoms. 
Finally, when VIe speak of life and mind, we 
imply a continuity of consciousness. For instance, 
if perceptions are to be wo rked up into concepts there 
must be something to which to refer perceptions. The 
inability of Materialism to explain life and oonscioua-
ness has been noted above. Here we may consider the 
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additional difficulty of joining consciousness to the 
flux of material atoms. In a lifetime an individual 
changes the atoms of his body several times. Why not 
those of his material soul aleo? Indeed Lucretius tells 
us that duri~ ordinary sleep a porticn of the soul atoms , 
a~e lost1 • This entire question is one of the most diff-
icu1t in the Epicurean theory. 
1. IV. 917. 
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Part 4, Sleep and Death. 
The analogy .between sleep and death has been 
widespread among peoples. The idea seems natural in 
the New Testament because of the belief in a reawaken-
ing . Vergil calls sleep the Twin Brother of Deathl , 
and Lucretius speaks of death as a'deep and eternal 
sleep!2 Furthermore the latter's explanations of the 
two phenomena are very similar $0 they may be treated 
together. 
Sleep and death are both a part of the theory o~ 
emanations for they presuppose a loss of atoms. 
Sleep occurs when a portion of the anima leaves 
the body and a portion condenses and withdraws into the 
Lucretius has previously told depths of the frame. 3 ~ 
us that the loss of the anima means 109B of sensation.-
Converse1y,a condition in which the body does not ex-
perience sensation indicates that the anima is not in 
operation. 
The ordinary cause of sleep is respiration. 5 
1. Aeneid, VI, 278. 
2. III, 465-6, 92l. 
3. IV, 916-18. 
4. III, 356. 
5. IV, 932-44. 
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Not only is the exterior of the body beaten at all 
times by the air, but the interior is also lashed be-
cause of the respiratory processes. This continuous 
buffeting disturbs the arrangements of the atoms of 
body and soul. The result is the departure of certain 
atoms of anima and the retirement of others, while still 
others are scattered far apart througb the body.l 
Lucretius thinks of the soul as giving buoyancy to the 
body as the air floats the earth in the midst of space~ 
so the frame becomes inert and heavy 3when the anima 
ceases to prop it up, so to speak. 4 Hence 'fit quasi 
paulatim nobis per membra ruin~'~ The sleep that 
follows the taking of food or pronounced fatigue is 
the soundest because the digestive process or weariness 
greatly disturbs the atoms. The result is that a 
greater portion of the anima is ejected, some atoms 
retire more deeply into the body6, probably into the 
bones or marrow as those parts are the most inaccess-
ible to sensation7, and the remair.der is scattered 
more widely through the frarLe. 
1. 
4. 
IV. 944-5. 
IV, 950. 
2. 
5. 
556-63. 
IV. 942. 
7. III, 250-1. 
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6. 
III,l13,1066. 
954-61. 
The significance of this division of the anima 
is apparently the fact that it renders the distance 
between the atoms of SQul so great that a rather 
violent vibration is necessary to enable them to touch 
each other and communica.te the mot ion that causes 
sensation,l 
Dea th is produced when the atoms of soul and 
body are so violently a gitated that the atomic motion 
which constitutes life is impeded 'to the core'. The 
soul then dispenses through all the pores2 . This is 
probably aided by the mob iIi ty of the soul a.toniS and 
by their lack of cohesion. The essential difference 
be tween sleep and death seems to be that in the latter 
not enough atoms of anima remain to rekindle sensatio~ 
that is, if any of those atoms are left, and Lucretius 
thinks there are4~ the intervals between them are too 
great to allow the sensiferi motus to be communicated 
from one to another5 . An injury to the animus is far 
more fatal than one to the anima9 
At times while one is asleep, the animus is 
1. 
4. 
III, 923-5. 
III, 717-21. 
2. 
5. 
- 121 -
II, 944-51. 
923-8 
3. 
6. 
III~ 923-8. 
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Her aclitus taught that the vitality of the soul and 
consequently its perfection, ~epends on its deriving 
its nourishment from the cosmic fire, and that one of 
the methods of obtaining this nourishment is sense 
perception, which is the absorption of the outer through 
the inner fire; this accounts for the depression of soul 
1 
activity in sleep. 
Notwithstabding the similarity of the phenomena 
of sleep and death, there is still a great difference, 
for Lucretius says, 
1. 
"Nee quisquam expergitus exstat, frigida quem 
semel est vitai pausa secuta" 2 
Windelband, "History of Ancient PhilOSOphy," 57. 
2. III, 929-30 
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VIII. The Theory of Death. 
The purpose of Lucretius's exposition of the 
nature of the Soul finds its fulfilment in the proof that 
1 
'Mortalem vi tam mors ---inmortalis ademi t .' .. 
The psychology,and indeed the whole system of physics, 
leads more or less directly to that end. After successfully 
combatting the fears that pertain to man's sojourn on 
earth, Lucretius proceeds to eradicatLa fear that con-
fronts all men, even those too ignorant to philosophize 
about the freedom of the will, - the fear of death. 
The fact that Lucretius puts forth a tremendous 
effort to overcome the belief in immortality shows that 
he considered this idea not only very deeply rooted, but 
also the cause of much disquietude. It will be well to 
examine these two points. 
There is an abundance of evidence to prove that 
the belief in immortality was very widespread in anti-
qUity2 and long before that, anthropologists tell us.3 
An examination of sepulchral inscriptions shows that the 
1. III, 869. 2. Friedlander J "Roman Life and 
Manners," 285-6. 
3. Marett, "Anthropology," 206. 
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number of epitaphs indicating a materialistic conception 
of the soul is exceedingly small in comparison with the 
thousands which reveal a strong faith in the future life. 
The practice of the cult of the dead and the belief in 
spirits are further proof. 
Ideas on immort&lity were vague l , but the popular 
belief on the whole in the Graeco-Roman world was still 
determined by the original Roman and Greek ideas of the 
future life. The prevailing conception was that of a 
more or les& material exi&tence, for the majcrity of men 
were not capable of exercising the faculty of abstraction 
required by the idea of a purely spiritual eX1stence2 . 
M. Guyaa says that at death the individual lost every-
thing and gained nothing. Death was the universal object 
of fear or rather one feared death less than the future 
life as represented by religion, for there had grown up 
a very tenacious association of ideas between the future 
life, the horror of the tomb, subterranean night and the 
phantoms with which the imagination is always inclined 
to people the night3 . In comparison ~ith this terrifying 
1. Friedl!nder, "Roman Life and Manners," 292. 
2. "Roman Life and Manners" 300: 
, 
3. "La Morale d' Epicure," 168. 
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prospect annihilation was preferable. 
Lucretius makes no clear analysis of the factors 
which enter into the fear of death. Most of his em-
phasis falls upon the fear of the after life. He says, 
"That fear of Acheron must be driven out precipitately, 
which roils human life from its very foundations, suffus-
ing everything with the sa ble hue of death and which 
leaves no pleasure pure and unmixed.!'f Men may boast 
that they believe the soul is mortal, but their conduct 
disproves their assertions, for they will endure exile 
and disgrace rather than seek death and thereby end their 
misery and, wherever they go)they sacrifice to the spirits 
of the dead and to the gods of the lower world, for in 
adverBity the mask is snatched away and one's true self 
is revealed. 2 Lucretius even makes the fear of death 
3 
the cause of all bad passions. Avarice and excessive 
an,bition, together with all kindred and resultant crimes, 
arise from man's struggle to secure the means wherewith 
to protect and prolong his life. 
To deliver man from this fear, Lucretius employs 
1. III, 37 - 40. 2. III, 39 - 58. 
3. III, 59 - 86. 
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two methods. First he appeals to the reason by proving 
scientifically that the soul is mortal and. therefore can-
no t suffer everlasting tormentsl , and secondly he reasons 
with men in an attempt to neconcile them to the thoughts 
of death2 • M. Guya~ calls the Epicurean theory the most 
remarkable effort ever made to deliver the human soul 
from the fear of death3 . 
The number of arguments in proof of the soul's 
morta.lity is placed by Ml:. Munro at twenty-eight. The 
earlier arguments are directed against a future life. 4 
To Lucretius, it is inconceivable to ascribe immortality 
to such a delicate fabric as the soul, especially since 
it develops with the body and is subject not only to 
maladies of its own, but also to diseases conveyed to it 
fron, the body. He adduces proof also that the soul is 
rent to pieces at death and hence cannot survive the body. 
The later arguwents5 zefute the doctrine of preexistence 
held by the Platonists and Pythagoreans, ho maintain 
that the life of the soul 'extends backwards into the in- . 
finite past as well as forwards into the endless futur~' 
1. III, 417 - 829. 2. III, 830 - 1094. 
3. "La Morale / d'Epicure/, 104. 4. III, 425 - 669. 
5. III, 670 - 783. 
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Granting that nothing exists but atoms and void, what 
we call a soul is a transitory phase in the flux of 
matter. Applied to such a soul, Lucretius's reasoning 
i s absolutely conclusive. 
Still the poet realizes that another element 
enters into the situation which cannot be removed by 
the cold, scientific reasoning just given. This is 
the instinctive shrinking from death, and, to reconcile 
man to meet the common fate, Lucreti~s devotes one of 
the noblest passages of his poem. Just as in times 
gone by we were not move d by the mightiest calamity 
that ever fell upon the Roman World, t he second Punic 
War, so in the future it will not concern us if earth, 
sea, and sky are mingled in one common diSSolutionl . 
Birth gave us the power of feeling , but death removes 
it. The span of life is but a speck between trIo in-
finities. 
One of the chief reasons why men shrink from 
death is that they project a conception of themse l vea 
as still living into the state beyond the grave. This 
1. '1IL 832 - 42. 
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shows that they cannot apply their Jelief in the mor-
1 
tali ty of the soul. A man imagines himself standing 
by and bemoaning the fate of his dead body which is 
being burned or lacerated by wild beasts. 2 The ideas 
of such an individual, Lucretius says) are doubly absurd 
for he imagines that he will have two selves, the one 
associated with the body, the other looking on, whereas 
his only self will cease to exist at the instant of 
death. Furthermore, people pity the dead because they 
are deprived of life's pleasures3,- conduct that is un-
reasonable since the dead are deprived not only of the 
longing for pleasures but also of ali sorrows4 . 
The ethical system of Epicurus refers the good 
and evil of everything to feelings of pain and pleasure. 
Death is the deprivation of the power to feel; it is 
neither positive nor negative in its effect; it means 
utter insensibility, the only mean, as M. Guya~ says, 
between pleasure and pain. 5 
A second oause of disquietude is vitae cupido6 
the insatiable desire to continue to live. For the 
1. .:m: 873 - 5. 2. III, 870-87 3. III, 894-99 
/ 
4. III, 900-5 5. "La Morale d' Epicure," 110. 
6. III, 931-77 
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r eproof of individ.uals unwilling to die l Lucretius in-
troduces Nature, who argues in a tone that is coldly 
convincing rather than comforting. She t ells men that 
i f their lives have been wisely spent, they should rise 
as a guest who has eaten enough of life's banquet and 
with calmness of spiritl betake themselves to restl. 
M. Guya~ s hows that this is the applicat~on of a philos-
ophical prinCiple of Epicurus to the effe ct that neitller 
longer life nor immortality would increase one's happi-
ness, for happiness is a complete whole sufficient in 
itself. What makes a difference in enjoyment is not 
its duration l but its intensity2. Furthermore , the 
3 desire to continue a mi sspent life is utter folly 
Finally, man must resign himself to the universal laws. 4 
Matter is in a flux. "Some creatures are born, others 
die, and in a brief spa ce of time the generations of 
living things are changed and like ruru1ers, hand on the 
torch of life." 5 Hence it is best to make a virt e 
of necessity and depart gracefully for , 
"Life is given to none in fee simpl e l but to all as 
usufrt..ct . ,,6 
1. 935-9. 2. "La Morale d' Epicure," 113. 
3 . III, 940-51. 4. III, 961-71. 5. II, 77 - 9. 
6. III, 971. 
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L Lucreti~s turns aside for a moment to prove that 
men's passions are the only hell there is and that 
exists in this 1ifel . Epicurean physics has enabled 
the poet to see beneath the earth and he has seen no 
Acheron. 2 . Tant~\us ia the man upon whom the wrath 
of the gods threatens to fall; Tityus is the individual 
whose heart is gnawed by passions; Sisyphus the disappointed 
politician; the sttve of the Dana ids , the insatiable 
soul; the instruments of torture are the stXings of a 
guilty conscience. In addition to all this comes the 
awe-inspiring thought that ~hese torments may be 
augmented beyond the grave. 
" Hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita.."~ 
The last argument in Lucretius's consolatio is 
the thought that since all the great and good have died, 
inaluding the greatest of all philosophers, a poor insig-
nificant creature whose life is worse than use less 
4 
should be willinG to die . 
The only remedy for superstitious fears, attend-
ing either life on earth or the condition beyon t the 
1. III, 978 - 1023. 2. III, 25 - 7. 3. III. 1023. 
4. III, 1024-52. 
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grave, is the philosophy of Epicurua. l 
Lucretius has not completely analyzed the fear of 
death. M. Guy~, howeyer, shows that it is not correct 
to confuse either the fear of the approach of death or 
the act of dying with the state of one no longer livingZ. 
This some critics have done. Epicurus considers that 
for one in life, death does not exist and for one in 
death, life does not exist. The pain of dyi~g, "le 
mauvais quart d' heure" is susceptible to the same 
alleviation~ other pains, the employment of courage. a 
Lucretius, it is true, deals with the love of life 
which is one of the positive elements which enters into 
the fear .of death, but he fails to eradicat~ 80 strong 
an instinct. It may be that various misadventures have 
killed in Lucretius the desire to live. Another element 
is the dread of laying~ide forever, one's affections, 
achievements, and hopes. The superstitious fears of 
death, arising from apprehensions of woes in a future 
life, Lucretius is successful in removing. The un-
willingness to relinquish all that is most dear on earth 
, 
1. 1071 - 2. a. "La Morale d' Epicure," 121 - 2. 
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he does not weaken. Cicero , in the "Dream of Sci iel 
bases his belief in immortality on the onde~~tl 
achievements of the hUuan mir. . Its po" er , i~ve t-
ivenesa and memory appear to him divir.e. T.is s me 
belief haa been confirmed by many peoples and Cicero's 
own arguwenta are repeated by tceolo~iane of the present 
day. 
To ask man to a i::a .o.on all hopes for t' e futur 
in order to eracicate a fear ich, to 0 t eo. Ie, 1 
probably far Ieee real t.ar. Lucretius ima~ines it, 1 
to demar!d a tremendous sacrifice rather t an to conf r 
a benefit. 
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Conclusion. 
Granted that all the absurdities and inexplic-
able features of the Epicurean physics are developed 
or find an application in the theory of the soul, the 
doctrine is nevertheless enobled by the purpose of 
Lucretius. 
The conduct of the world has been removed from 
With the poet, we are tile caprice of Divine beings. 
enabled to look beyond the "flamin::; walls of the world" 
and see the gods in calrn. repose, while Nature orders 
the affairs of the universe. Man's destiny has been 
wrested from the power of Necessity and placed in his 
own control. Death has beeD roboed of those terraY5 
which pertain to an unfortunate future state. The 
majesty and earnestness of the diction and thought al-
most convince us and make us momentarily forget that the 
Epicurean creed compels man to renounce two of the 
beliefs most inherent in the race, the belief in God 
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and ·in the immortality of the soul. 
Still, in view of the conditions surrounding 
life in the ancient world, particularly the popular 
religious beliefs, the teachings of Epicurus and his 
d~ciple must be regarded as constructive as well as 
destructive. Though one of the least elevated of the 
ancient systems of philosophy, Epicureanism has been 
almost glorified by the nobility of purpose, the sy~­
pathy, the tenderness of hea~t and the sinoerity, as 
well as by the great poetic power which Lucretius 
devotes to the magnification of the dignity of Man and 
the effort to enable him to attain peace for his soul 
on earth. Withal, there is something profoundly 
appealing in the voice of the Roman poet, as it comes 
down through the centuries, indicating the path of life. 
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